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I. INTRODUCTION
In securities-fraud cases, the stakes are high and the litigation is costly, complicated,
and time-consuming. Many people invest in the markets, directly or indirectly, to help buy
a home, save for retirement, or send children to college. Thus, allegations that fraud
tampered with these investments are serious. For these investors, a legitimate securitiesfraud suit may present the opportunity to recover these savings, retirement nest eggs, or
children's college funds that were lost, not because of risk attendant to investment
generally, but because of fraud. A securities-fraud suit is serious for companies as well.
For companies, the threat of a securities-fraud suit stands out as a nasty attack on business
reputation and a significant litigation risk. Companies have every interest in getting these
suits dismissed at the earliest practical time.
Whether a securities-fraud suit is timely is an elementary and crucial question for both
sides because failing to file within the limitations periods can be case dispositive. The
securities laws set time limits for bringing lawsuits based on when a reasonable investor
would have discovered the fraud and when the fraud occurred. If investors do not comply
with these time limits, then they are barred from the courthouse-no matter how egregious
the scheme or how great their loss. The seemingly draconian result is justified by
limitations periods' salutary purposes. For one, deadlines ensure that evidence is relatively
fresh, which promotes resolution on the merits. In addition, a time limit allows defendants
and others to rest easy knowing that after a certain time, their past transactions will not
unravel with a lawsuit.
Legal deadlines are supposed to set clear rules for what is timely and what isn't.1 Far
from easy to apply, however, the law of limitations periods for securities cases is a
collection of unsettled questions. This Article discusses the securities laws' legal deadlines
and finds that the uncertainty with which they apply renders them less effective than they
otherwise could be. Questions linger about whether the securities laws' limitations periods
afford any room for equitable exceptions, like tolling, estoppel, or forfeiture. And, as of
late, questions concerning how limitations periods apply to securities class actions have
come to the fore. But uncertainty in the law of limitations benefits no one. Absent clear
timeliness rules, litigants and the system expend time and money resolving purely
procedural issues. 2
1. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) ("Few areas of the law stand in greater need of
firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of periods of limitation.").
2. Cf Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that deciding which limitations
period applies "wastes untold hours"); Tellis v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 1986)
("Several centuries from now, when the archeologists have unearthed a copy of the Federal Reporter and turned
it over to the legal historians for study and analysis, our descendants will indeed be puzzled to discover that a
society in which judicial resources were such a scarce 'commodity' expended so much of that 'commodity'
searching its state codes for 'analogous' limitation periods. I doubt very much that, at least in this regard, our
priorities will command much admiration.").
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But litigants need not wait for the judiciary or the legislature to resolve the ambiguity
of limitations periods. Instead, the parties themselves can accomplish the laudable aims of
limitations periods (saving merited claims, deterring the use of stale evidence, and
preventing litigation uncertainty) by entering into tolling agreements. This Article shows
that tolling agreements should validly arrest the securities laws' limitations periods-the
statutes of limitations and the statutes of repose. Thus, this Article advocates "leav[ing]
time for trouble" 3 by using tolling agreements to arrest limitations periods and remedy the
unclear application of statutory timeliness bars.
II. THE LIMITATIONS PERIODS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
A. The Purposes of the Securities Laws'LimitationsPeriods
Limitations bars, including those governing securities cases, must balance competing
aims. On the one hand, timeliness bars must be long enough to allow litigants enough time
to discover and file merited claims. 4 On the other hand, timeliness bars must be short
enough to mitigate the risk that evidence of merited claims will become stale 5 and relieve
potential defendants and others from unending uncertainty about whether prior transactions
will be scrutinized in court. 6
1. Allowing Sufficient Time to Investigate and File a Securities-FraudCase
Time limits for filing a securities-fraud action must account for the time it takes to
uncover and investigate a securities-fraud scheme. In general, plaintiffs file securities class
actions within days or months of a company's announcement of bad news to the market.7

3. David D. Siegel, The Stature ofLimitations in FederalPractice,Including the New "General" One in
FederalQuestion Cases, 134 F.R.D. 481, 485 (1991).
4. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975) ("Although any statute of
limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value
judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the
interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones."); Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir.
1997) ("The statute of limitations in securities fraud cases serves ... important public purposes.... But too much
emphasis on the statute of limitations can precipitate premature and groundless suits, as plaintiffs rush to beat the
deadline without being able to obtain good evidence of fraud; and the three-year statute of repose gives defendants
a definite limit beyond which they needn't fear being sued.").
5. See, e.g., Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1221 (2013) ("Statutes of limitations are intended to 'promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."') (internal citation and quotation omitted).
6. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002) (stating that all limitations periods provide
"repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff s opportunity for recovery and a defendant's
potential liabilities") (internal citation omitted).
7.

See, e.g., ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., 5 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIEs FRAUD &

COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 10:46 (2d ed. 2013) (stating that fraud-on-the-market class actions, which charge
misrepresentations of a public company's finances or prospects, "are commonly filed within days (if not hours)
of the company's writeoff, negative announcement, or decline in stock price which usually mark the moment
when the 1 year statutes starts to run. And the underlying misrepresentations are rarely more than 3 years in the
past."). At a minimum, investors often file class action complaints within a year of the end of the alleged class
period, which most often corresponds with the last day on which the plaintiffs say the company's stock price
plummeted as news of the company's fraud hit the market. According to NERA Economic Consulting, in 2013,
about 83% of class action complaints were filed within a year of the end of the alleged class period, and the
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Investors and their counsel are often fast to file a securities class action after a company
announces bad news because, historically, the plaintiff who filed first was most likely to
be appointed to lead the class. 8 The lead spot comes with the lions' share of attorneys' fees,
which can be substantial in a securities case. 9 In 1995, however, Congress changed the
procedure for selecting a lead plaintiff, instead adopting a mechanism that favored the
presence of large institutional investors (e.g., pension funds) to serve in the lead-plaintiff
role and presumably to slow the race to the courthouse. 10 But securities lawsuits are filed
just as quickly after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) as before it. 1 1
The speed with which plaintiffs firms file lawsuits may be a byproduct of offering
institutional investors preferred status under the PSLRA. 12 After the PSLRA, plaintiffs'
findings for 2013 are consistent with the average number of cases filed within a year from the prior four years:
2009: 66.1%; 2010: 73.7%; 2011: 83.3%; and 2012: 90.6%. Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends
in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2013 Full-Year Review, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 16 (Jan. 1, 2014),
available at http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_2013 YearEndTrends
1.2014.pdf.
8. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-269, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 732 ("The
Conference Committee was also troubled by the plaintiffs' lawyers 'race to the courthouse' to be the first to file
a securities class action complaint. This race has caused plaintiffs' attorneys to become fleet of foot and sleight
of hand. Most often speed has replaced diligence in drafting complaints. The Conference Committee believes two
incentives have driven plaintiffs' lawyers to be the first to file. First, courts traditionally appoint counsel in class
action lawsuits on a 'first come, first serve' basis. Courts often afford insufficient consideration to the most
thoroughly researched, but later filed, complaint. The second incentive involves the court's decision as to who
will become lead plaintiff. Generally, the first lawsuit filed also determines the lead plaintiff"); In re Wells Fargo
Securities Litigation, 156 F.R.D. 223, 226 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("In securities cases, particularly, plaintiff lawyers
race to have the first case on file after the shock to the security's price that triggers the case and thereby to earn
some kind of credit for earnestness in securing lead counsel designation.").
9. The average settlement amount in a securities case can be substantial. See Comolli & Starykh, supra
note 7, at 26 (finding the average settlement in 2013 for securities class actions as $55 million, and that in 2012
it was $36 million). A sizable percentage of a sizable settlement can mean sizable attorneys' fees. Id. at 33 (finding
that for securities class actions resolved between 1996 and 2013, attorneys' fees as a percentage of settlement
value range from 7.6% to 33.3% depending on the settlement value); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical
Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 814 (2010)
(concluding that the mean and median fee award for class counsel is about 25%); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
248, 265 (2010) (finding that the mean award from settlements in the $100 to $250 million range is 12% and the
median 10.2%).
10. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), in part, to slow
investors' race to the courthouse. The PSLRA established a procedure for selecting lead plaintiffs that presumes
that the best representative for the class is not the first-filer, but the investor with the largest financial interest.
The PSLRA requires the first-filing plaintiff to publish notice to the class within 20 days to encourage the most
capable plaintiff to step forward. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3) (1995) (describing the process for selecting a lead plaintiff); Bang v. Acura Pharm., No. 10 C 5757, 2011
WL 91099, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2011) (describing the PSLRA's effect on the "race to the courthouse method").
11. Michael A. Perino, Did the PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913,
913 (2003).
12. Since the PSLRA, institutional investors are more likely to serve as lead plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ellen M.
Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2010 Review and Analysis, CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH 8 (2011), availableat http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2010/Settlements-Through12-2010.pdf (finding that institutional investors-primarily labor and public pension funds-serve as the lead
plaintiffs in approximately two-thirds of all securities class actions); James D. Cox et al., There are Plaintiffsand
... There are Plaintifs:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REv. 355,
385 (2008) ("The lead plaintiff provision sought to attract institutions and others who have a significant stake in
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law firms wooed institutional investors by offering to monitor these institutions'
investments for free and to notify them when they may have a securities-fraud action. 13
These monitoring arrangements keep institutions up to date on potential securities cases. 14
Even though plaintiffs file securities cases quickly, these cases still take time to
uncover and investigate. Fraud, by its nature, involves concealing the truth, and fraudulent
schemes can be complex. Investors may not uncover the most extensive or corrupt scheme
for some time. 15 Take for example, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, where the president of an
investment firm perpetrated a Ponzi scheme for 25 years, which was uncovered only after
he committed suicide and left a note explaining that the firm was bankrupt.16 Occasionally,
securities fraud will become known through chance, like through a remorseful fraudster's
suicide note or where a scheme collapses under its own weight.17 More common, however,
is that the media, industry regulators, short sellers, stock analysts, etc., expose corporate
fraud. 18 But these sources are not always obligated to reveal to the investing public what
they know, let alone reveal what they know within a certain time.
Even when plaintiffs get a whiff of fraud, plaintiffs still have to conduct a pre-filing
investigation-without access to formal discovery-to uncover evidence sufficient to
satisfy the securities laws' heightened pleading demands. 19 Just sifting through the sheer

the litigation to become the suit's plaintiff. Our findings not only reflect that nearly eighteen percent of securities
class action settlements in suits initiated after the PSLRA are prosecuted by institutional plaintiffs of the type
desired by Congress, but also, more importantly, that they add substantial value to the outcome.").
13. See Jed S. Rakoff, Confidential Informants and Securities Class Actions: Mixed Messages andMotives,
45 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 571 (2014) (explaining the relationship between law firms and institutional investors
after Congress passed the PSLRA); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions, 80 U. CIN.
L. REv. 299, 301 (2011) [hereinafter Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions] (describing practices of law
firms courting institutional investors); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintifs,64 VAND. L. REV.
1109, 1121 (2011) [hereinafter Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintifs]("After the PSLRA, plaintiffs' law firms sought
to maintain their competitive advantage by courting large institutions. . .").
14. Brief of Amici Curiae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of Respondents at 33, Merck &
Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (No. 08-905).
15. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrowv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 377 (1991) ("The real burden
on most investors ... is the initial matter of discovering whether a violation of the securities laws occurred at all.
This is particularly the case for victims of the classic fraudlike case that often arises under § 10(b). '[C]oncealment
is inherent in most securities fraud cases.' The most extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within
the time allowed for bringing an express cause of action under the 1934 Act. Ponzi schemes, for example, can
maintain the illusion of a profit-making enterprise for years, and sophisticated investors may not be able to
discover the fraud until long after its perpetration.") (internal citation omitted); THE CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL
FRAUD ACCOUNTABILrrY ACT OF 2002, S. REP. No. 107-146, at 9 (2002) ("As most prosecutors and victims will
confirm . . . the best cons are designed so that even after victims are cheated, they will not know who cheated
them, or how. Especially in securities fraud cases, the complexities of how the fraud was executed often take well
over a year to unravel, even after the fraud is discovered. Even with use of the full resources of the FBI, a Special
Task Force of Justice Department Attorneys, and the power of a federal grand jury, complex fraud cases such as
Enron are difficult to unravel and rarely can be charged within a year.").
16. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1976).
17. E.g., In re Bernard L. Madofflnv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229,232 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how Bernard
Madoff's billion-dollar Ponzi scheme came to light when "the flow of new investments could no longer support
the payments required on earlier invested funds" and ultimately collapsed).
18. See, e.g., I.J. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle On CorporateFraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
2224-26 (2010).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (1995) (staying discovery pending "any motion to dismiss").
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volume of information companies pour out into the public domain can take a while. 2 0 In
addition, a key component to satisfying the pleading standard for securities claims and
demonstrating a strong inference of scienter (a necessary component for liability under
Rule 1Ob-5) often involves obtaining information from inside the company to show that
what the company told the investing public wasn't matching what the company was saying
internally. 2 1 One of the more common ways investors get the inside scoop is by talking
with former employees whose accounts investors can put forward in the complaint,
typically as allegations attributed to confidential witnesses. 2 2 Marshalling sufficient
evidence takes time, and filing first and amending later is not without risk given that, in
some courts, the liberal policy for amendments may be curtailed by the securities laws'
heightened pleading standard. 2 3
2. The "Stale Evidence" Rationale
The time allowed for uncovering, investigating, and filing a securities-fraud complaint
must be balanced against competing aims, one of which is to prevent the use of stale
evidence. The "stale evidence" rationale for limitations periods is rooted in the idea that
claims are more likely to be resolved on their merits if litigants preserve, gather, and
produce evidence closer in time to the event that gave rise to the claim. A lawsuit involves
a fact-finding process of pleading, discovery, and trial, and this fact-finding process is more
reliable if the evidence in the case is fresh. 24 Evidence is more likely to be preserved by

20. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Council of Institutional Investors in Support of Respondents at 7, Merck &
Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (No. 08-905) ("Companies introduce numerous types of information
into the marketplace on a daily basis. Each company alone may make more than ten filings per year with the SEC,
not counting restatements. Additionally, companies regularly file press releases, maintain websites containing
company information, news, and events, and, in the case of pharmaceutical companies, conduct studies regarding
their existing products, as well as those still in development, and release reports of the results.").
21. See Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226,1230 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The
most direct way to show both that a statement was false when made and that the party making the statement knew
that it was false is via contemporaneous reports or data, available to the party, which contradict the statement.");
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he inference may arise where the complaint sufficiently
alleges that the defendants . . . knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements
were not accurate.").
22. See, e.g., City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[A] securities class action cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless it provides considerable
factual detail supporting each of the essential elements of a securities fraud claim. . . . While designed to give
district courts a 'gatekeeper' responsibility to derail dubious class action lawsuits at the outset, an unintended
consequence has been to cause plaintiffs' counsel to undertake surreptitious pre-pleading investigations designed
to obtain 'dirt' from dissatisfied corporate employees. Thus in this case, as in many others, the Amended
Complaint relied heavily, although not exclusively, on information attributed to 'confidential witnesses'
('CWs').").
23. See Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220,236 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the liberal amendment policy under
Rule 15 is curtailed by the PSLRA), overruledonother grounds by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 327 (2007); Stambaugh v. Corrpro Co., 116 F. App'x. 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
heightened pleading standards of PSLRA in reviewing amended complaints); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 91
F. App'x. 418, 443--44 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the higher standard of review fora leave to amend a complaint).
24. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) ("Statutes of
limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to a wellordered judicial system. Making out the substantive elements of a claim for relief involves a process of pleading,
discovery, and trial. The process of discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate facts for or against
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plaintiffs and defendants if plaintiffs have a prompt deadline for filing. 25 Indeed, a timely
suit gives defendants notice to start gathering evidence while that evidence is still fresh. 2 6
The risk of stale evidence is not absent in securities cases. First, even though the
securities laws and practice surrounding the appointment of lead plaintiffs encourage quick
filing, there is still a chance that investors have discovered facts that warrant suit and are
ready to move forward but, for whatever reason, have sat on their claims. 27 Second, with
the passage of time, no matter how slight, there is still the risk that evidence-witnesses'
memories and the documents-may go stale or missing.
Witness memory is important because state of mind matters in securities cases. The
securities laws factor in, either as positive elements or as defenses, the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the statement (i.e., scienter and good faith), 28 as well as what the
investor was thinking at the time of the investment (i.e., reliance). 29 And the circumstances

the plaintiff by the judge or jury is obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively
fresh.").
25. See, e.g., Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868) ("The policy of these statutes is
to encourage promptitude in the prosecution of remedies.").
26. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) ("Limitations periods are intended to
put defendants on notice of adverse claims . . ."); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980) ("The
statute of limitations ... recognizes that after a certain period of time it is unfair to require the defendant to attempt
to piece together his defense to an old claim.").
27. Cf City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 844 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (observing that plaintiffs' firm did not file suit until "the very last day" before the limitations period was
set to expire and moved for appointment as lead plaintiff also on "the very last day any plaintiff could move to be
appointed lead plaintiff," and that the actions taken were "self-protective tactics, designed to ensure that no other
plaintiffs firm could swoop in and profit from [the firm's] work merely because that firm had a client with a
larger financial stake").
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (permitting non-issuers to defend a Section 11 lawsuit by showing that they
undertook a reasonable investigation and formed an actual, reasonable belief in the truth of the representations);
15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (affording defenses of lack of knowledge or exercise of reasonable care to Section 12(a)(2)
claims); 15 U.S.C. § 77o (allowing aperson who controls another who has violated the 1933 Act to defend himself
by proving he acted in good faith); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (requiring plaintiffs claiming violations of Section 10(b)
and Rule lob-5 to allege a "strong inference" that the defendant acted with scienter); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (allowing
a person who controls another who has violated the 1934 Act to defend himself by proving he acted in good faith);
see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988) (requiring that for actions under Section 12(a)(1), plaintiffs
must prove that the defendant was motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or
those of the securities owner); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976) (requiring that for
actions under Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs must plead and prove that the defendants acted with scienter, an intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (permitting issuers to defend a Section 11 lawsuit by proving that, at the time of the
plaintiff s acquisition of the security, the plaintiff knew of the alleged misrepresentation or omission); Stoneridge
Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008) ("Reliance by the plaintiff upon the
defendant's deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action."); Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988) ("Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to
rebut the presumption of reliance . . . .For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic's statements were false
and that Basic was indeed engaged in merger discussions, and who consequently believed that Basic stock was
artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because of other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential
antitrust problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of certain businesses, could not be said to have
relied on the integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated."). To further the point, defendants often seek and
obtain discovery of the plaintiffs' past investments in order to uncover evidence about the plaintiffs state of mind
when investing. See, e.g., Degulis v. LXR Biotech., Inc., 176 F.R.D. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (compelling an
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surrounding the fraud are relevant as we can infer someone's mental state from those
circumstances. 30
Someone's mental state, as well as the circumstances surrounding it, may be difficult
to verify after several years have passed. With the passage of time, memories may fade, or
important witnesses may move, die, or disappear. 3 1 In fact, experimental studies suggest
that the passage of time has a highly distorting effect on witness memory. 32 This very
idea-that statements closer in time are more reliable than later statements-underlies the
Federal Rules of Evidence that admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay (or second-hand)
statements. 33
investor to produce monthly account statements for any securities or commodities account maintained by that
investor because the documents would shed light on the investor's sophistication, which was relevant to the
investor's claim of direct reliance under Section 10(b) and common-law fraud); Ziemack v. Centel Corp., No. 92
C 3551, 1995 WL 729295, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 1995) (compelling investors to produce documents related to
trading history as relevant to investors' sophistication, which was relevant to common-law fraud claims); In re
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., Sec. Litig., 838 F. Supp. 109, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (compelling plaintiff to
produce documents identifying publicly traded securities owned or controlled by the named plaintiffs because
documents would shed light on the investor's sophistication and was relevant to direct reliance in a traditional
Rule lOb-5 claim).
30. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983) ("[T]he proof of scienter
required in fraud cases is often a matter of inference from circumstantial evidence."); cf, e.g., In re Merck & Co.,
Inc., Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No. 05-2367 SRC, 2012 WL 4764589, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,2012) (holding
that discovery would not be limited to the class period because pre- and post-class evidence is relevant); In re
SunPower Sec. Litig., No. 09-cv-5473, 2012 WL 4343245, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (holding the same);
In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 10-922 DSF, 2012 WL 3791716, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012)
(holding the same).
31. See, e.g., Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that several plaintiffs died
during the 19-year span between the stock sales and the time of trial).
32. See, e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive
Neuroscience, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 182, 184 (1999) (discussing the transience of memory and the process of
forgetting); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 53 (1996); see also Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897
F.2d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1990) (summarizing cognitive psychology research on the accuracy of memory: "The
basic findings are: accuracy of recollection decreases at a geometric rather than arithmetic rate (so passage of
time has a highly distorting effect on recollection); accuracy of recollection is not highly correlated with the
recollector's confidence; and memory is highly suggestible-people are easily 'reminded' of events that never
happened, and having been 'reminded' may thereafter hold the false recollection as tenaciously as they would a
true one.").
33. Hearsay is "a tale of a tale," "a story out of another man's mouth." See KENNETH S. BROUN, 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244 (7th ed. 2013) (quoting College's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, 663 (1681) and
Gascoigne's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 959, 1019 (1680)); see also Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d
981, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2009) (discounting allegations in a complaint attributed to confidential witnesses because
the accounts were "vague hearsay"). When someone is relating hearsay, the account is suspect because the person
testifying "is not obliged to enter into any particulars, to answer any questions, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; he intrenches [sic] himself in
the simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely on his dead or absent author." Coleman v.
Southwick, 9 Johns 45, 1812 WL 989, at *50 (N.Y. Sup. 1812) (internal quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the
Federal Rules of Evidence sometimes treat hearsay as reliable and admissible evidence. Rule 803(1), for example,
allows a court to admit hearsay statements made by the speaker while the speaker is perceiving the event or
immediately after. These statements are considered reliable (and thus admissible) because the immediacy of a
present-sense impression largely reduces the risk of a lack of memory and precludes time for reflection or revision.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 8:67

(4th ed. 2013). Likewise,

Rule 803(2) allows a court to admit hearsay statements made under the stress of excitement. These statements are
considered reliable (and thus admissible) because the speaker's memory "is bound to be fresh because the
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The passage of time also increases the likelihood that hindsight may taint evidence.
Cognitive psychologists have found that what happens between the event and its recall can
change a person's memory of it. 34 The worry that intervening events may unduly color our
assessment of preceding ones is certainly attendant in securities cases. There is a tendency
for people to conclude that a later, bad outcome was not only predictable but also actually
predicted by a firm's managers at the time an earlier, cheerier statement was made, a
tendency referred to as "the hindsight bias." 3 5 But there is no reason to assume that what
is true at the moment of the discovery of the alleged fraud was also true at the time of the
alleged misrepresentation. 36 The courts have thus prohibited basing fraud merely on
hindsight. 37 Indeed, in the time between when a firm announces something to public
investors and some sobering truth is revealed (and the company's stock price drops), a
number of events could have happened that explain the difference between an earlier,
positive statement and a later, less rosy picture. Between an alleged misstatement and a
drop in stock price, there may be a general decline in the stock market, a specific decline
in the market for the defendant-firm's industry, a change in consumer demand, the entrance
of new competitors onto the market, the filing of a major lawsuit, an internal reevaluation
of assets, or recalculation of loan-loss reserves.3 8 Timeliness bars in securities cases help

impression has not yet passed from his mind." Id. § 8:68. The Federal Rules contain additional examples. Rule
803(3) allows a court to admit a statement of a declarant's then-existing state of mind or emotional, sensory, or
physical condition, but not a statement to prove the fact remembered. These statements are admissible because
"problems of memory are negligible and problems of perception minimal, and such statements seem better (more
reliable, more persuasive) than the next best alternative, which is backward-looking testimony by the person." Id.
§ 8:71. Rule 803(6) allows a court to admit business records made contemporaneously with an event. The premise
of this rule is that a record made close in time to the event, when memories are fresh, is more reliable than a later
memory. Id. § 8:78. And Rule 803(16) allows a court to admit ancient documents (at least 20 years old). These
documents are allowed as evidence because live, aged testimony is likely no more reliable. The "passage of time
lowers the marginal value of live testimony over hearsay. Eyewitness accounts of events 20 years in the past are
likely to be less reliable than accounts of recent events, and testimonial descriptions of oral statements made long
ago (admissions or excited utterances) are less reliable than descriptions of more recent ones." Id. § 8:100.
34. See, e.g., Douglas J. Narby et al., The Effects of Witness, Target, and SituationalFactorson Eyewitness
Identifications,in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 23, 44-46 (Siegfried Ludwig Sporer
et. al. eds., 1996).
35. See Mitu Gulati et al., FraudBy Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 773, 775 (2004) ("Courts cite concerns
with hindsight in nearly one-third of all published opinions in securities class action cases. . . . [C]ourts seem
generally aware of the problem posed by judging securities fraud cases in hindsight. Judges routinely admonish
plaintiffs not to rely on hindsight to support allegations of fraud in pleading securities claims. Increasingly, the
doctrine against 'fraud by hindsight' has become a hurdle that plaintiffs in securities cases must overcome.").
36. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), supersededby statute.
37. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) ("There is no 'fraud by hindsight,' in
Judge Friendly's felicitous phrase."); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) ("In sum, the complaint
is an example of alleging fraud by hindsight.").
38. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1548; see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
342-43 (2005) ("When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, that lower price may
reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations,
new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together
account for some or all of that lower price. (The same is true in respect to a claim that a share's higher price is
lower than it would otherwise have been-a claim we do not consider here.) Other things being equal, the longer
the time between purchase and sale, the more likely that this is so, i.e., the more likely that other factors caused
the loss.").
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prevent recoveries based on hindsight. 39
Similarly, with the passage of time, documents may be lost or destroyed. 40 Securities
cases typically involve alleged misleading or untrue statements made to the public in a
registration statement, prospectus, press release, earnings statement, public filing, and the
like. By virtue of their public (and publicized) status, there is rarely a dispute about what
was said in these cases. 4 1 But still these cases come down to what the paper record shows
about the circumstances surrounding what was said-what the paper documents, emails,
and internal presentations show. 42 And just as memories may be lost as time goes by, so
too are documents subject to loss over any given period. First, there is the plainly sinister
reason that documents do not survive the test of time: they are destroyed to cover up any
wrongdoing. 43 Second, documents can be destroyed without any motive to sweep misdeeds
under the rug. Consider that many large companies-the typical defendants in securities
class actions-have document-retention policies that provide for routine destruction or
deletion of data after a certain period. These kinds of policies are "common in business." 44
And one can see why: without such a policy, one could "drown in paper." 45 There are
unusual circumstances, however, where there is a legal duty to hold on to documents. 46
39. See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg., Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Prices of securities
are volatile. If suit may be postponed indefinitely on equitable grounds, then investors may gamble with other
people's money. An investor . .. may sell her shares for a price certain. If the firm does poorly, she keeps the
money; if it does well, she sues and asks for the increase in value. Congress chose one year after discovery, and
a cap of two additional years on tolling principles, in order to curtail the extent to which the securities laws permit
recoveries based on the wisdom given by hindsight. . . . Investors then have a more powerful incentive to
investigate rather than accept another person's word without question. . . . Prudent investors almost always can
sniff out fraud (or enough smoke to justify litigation) within three years. Section 13 cuts off only the claims of
the most trusting or somnolent-or the most wily, those who wanted to wait as long as possible.").
40. See, e.g., R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (stating that limitations
periods "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared").
41. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?A Study ofSettlements in Securities Class Actions,
43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 527 n.105 (1991).
42. Christopher R. Leslie, Den oflnequity: The Casefor EquitableDoctrinesin Rule 1Ob-5 Cases, 81 CALIF.
L. REV. 1587, 1636 (1993) ("[S]ecurities fraud cases live and die on the paper record.").
43. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary captured this idea in its report on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 in response to the Enron debacle when it warned that "[i]t only takes a few seconds to warm up the shredder."
S. REP. No. 107-146, at 9 (2002).
44. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005); see also Thomas Y. Allman, Editor,
The Sedona Conference Commentary on Email Management: Guidelinesfor the Selection of Retention Policy, 8
SEDONA CONF. J. 239, 240-41 (2007) ("Limitations or 'quotas' on the amount of storage space on the network
available to an individual user has historically been a principal feature of email management. In a 2005 Industry
Survey, over one half of the respondents reported that they were 'managing' email retention by limiting mailbox
sizes.").
45. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 412 F.3d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 2005);
see also Roland C. Goss, Hot Issues in ElectronicDiscovery: Information Retention Programsand Preservation,
42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 797,806 (2007) (explaining how Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) implicitly permits goodfaith corporate policies for the purging of data "necessary to prevent a build-up of data that can overwhelm the
most robust electronic information systems").
46. When there is a reasonable anticipation of litigation, firms and persons have a common-law duty to
preserve documents and information. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see also Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal v. Banc of Am. Sec., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). If a federal investigation or bankruptcy is contemplated, then any altering, destroying, or concealing of
documents with an intent to impede those proceedings can result in fines and jail time. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. Auditors
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Otherwise, under ordinary circumstances, there is no legal duty to be a pack rat and nothing
47
inherently wicked in complying with a valid document-retention policy.
3. The "LitigationUncertainty" Rationale
Not only must limitations periods account for uncovering, investigating, and filing a
securities-fraud complaint and promoting the use of fresh evidence, but limitations periods
must also aim to reduce litigation uncertainty. This rationale is based on two related
propositions. First, at some point, it is simply unfair to subject someone to the lingering
possibility that litigation could be brought at any moment. 4 8 As Oliver Wendell Holmes
has said, "A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether
property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your
49
resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it."
The second proposition is that someone who is constantly distracted by the threat of
litigation is less likely to devote resources to productive purposes. 50 Preparing for and
defending against litigation increases the costs of doing business and diverts resources from
other efforts. For instance, once a company reasonably anticipates litigation, the company
has to retain counsel, take steps to identify and preserve documents, notify its insurers, and
evaluate insurance coverage. 5 1 Even before suit, uncertain limitations periods may cause
companies and its directors to pay for larger insurance policies than they would otherwise.
Thus, from the standpoint of a company and its directors, the more quickly they know about
a lawsuit, the better.5 2
of a reporting firm also must maintain all audit and review papers for five years (failure to do so can result in
fines and imprisonment). 18 U.S.C. § 1520. Moreover, brokers and dealers subject to the securities laws must
keep communications relating to their business for at least three years. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4.
47. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 704; Fidelity Nat 'I Title Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 412 F.3d at 751.
48. See Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1221 (2013) ("[E]ven wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their
sins may be forgotten.") (intemal citation and quotation omitted); Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) ("[E]ven if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice
to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over
the right to prosecute them.").
49. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofLaw, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897).
50. See, e.g., McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[B]usiness planning is impeded
by contingent liabilities that linger indefinitely."); Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The
legislative history in 1934 makes it pellucid that Congress included statutes of repose because of fear that lingering
liabilities would disrupt normal business and facilitate false claims."); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d
450, 463 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he shorter period permits the company's management to treat a given securities
transaction as closed, allowing them to proceed more confidently with running the company."); see also Suzette
M. Malveaux, Statutes ofLimitations:A Policy Analysis in the Context ofReparationsLitigation, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 68, 76 (2005) ("With a limitations system intact, institutions can engage in commercial transactions
unencumbered by the risk of litigation and able to structure and plan their affairs.").
51. See, e.g., N. Scott Fletcher & Jefferson T. Michael, PreliminaryActions for Companies Facing
SecuritiesLitigation, 11 COM. & BUS. LITIG. 3 (2010).
52. 78 CONG. REC. 8200 (daily ed. May 7, 1934) ("[F]rom the standpoint of the director, the more quickly
he knows whether he is liable, the better."); see also Anthony M. Sabino, The New Uniform Statute ofLimitations
for FederalSecurities FraudActions: Its Evolution, Its Impact, and a Call For Reform, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 485,
522-23 (1992) ("The 'litigation risk,' like any other component of economics, is something the modem business
entity measures on a cost-effective basis. For [the company financial advisor or professional who bears some risk
of a section 10(b) suit merely by participating in the capital market], the potential to be a defendant is not
necessarily a function of wrongdoing; it may instead be grounded upon various and sundry things, such as a

154

The Journal of CorporationLaw

[Vol. 40:1

Finality for securities transactions protects settled economic expectations of not just
the defendant firm or stock issuers, but a multitude of other economic actors as well. 53 This
idea is often expressed in the securities case law as preventing investors from gambling
with other people's money. Certainly, no one likes the idea that suspicious investors may
sit on the sidelines in perpetuity, waiting for stock prices to rebound and reap investment
profits, or waiting for the stock to stay down and recover damages in court. That kind of
"heads, I win; tails, you lose" situation is one that the law abhors. 54 Consider that stock is
"usually marketed through underwriters and dealers, often including scores of investment
banking and brokerage firms across the country." 55 Repose protects the expectations of
these repeat market players as well. Repose also protects other nonculpable market players,
such as investors, employees, and lenders, to name a few. In the span from the purported
fraud until suit, "thousands of people may have invested in the corporation, hundreds of

deleterious change in the economic or legal environment, mistakes in business judgment, misplaced optimism in
forecasting the future or the mere fact that it is the 'deep pocket' targeted by disgruntled investors or, worse yet,
'quick-buck' artists out to scam a settlement in lieu of a costly lawsuit. This, then, is the risk of litigation that
every business, and especially those involved in the stock markets, must take measure of, and accordingly guard
against.").
53. See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 50, at 76 ("Given the greater interdependency and globalization of
individuals and institutions today, repose plays an even more significant role in providing stability and certainty
on a macro level.").
54. 78 CONG. REc. 8199 (daily ed. May 7, 1934) ("[If an investor] finds some technical mistake in the
[registration] statement that has been put out, he might say to himself, 'I have something that I can sue on if these
bonds go down. If they go up I will not want to sue because I will get a profit on them, but should they go down,
then I have the option of suing."'); see also McCann, 663 F.3d at 931 ("If section 1658(b) were a statute of
limitations ... a person who had bought a security could, having later discovered that he'd been defrauded, wait
indefinitely to determine whether his purchase had been a mistake (because of the fraud) or a windfall (because
despite the fraud the price of the security had risen beyond expectations), since his two-year period under
subsection (1) would not begin to run until the fraud caused him harm. This would be a heads I win, tails you
lose, proposition, which the law would be unlikely to countenance."); Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d
863, 868 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Such delay is unfair to defendants .... While plaintiff is waiting to see whether his
investment recovers on its own, defendant 'loses the security of knowing when legal action against him has been
foreclosed.' . . .Plaintiff, by contrast, gets the benefit of a 'heads I win, tails you lose' bet: If the investment goes
up, he reaps the profit; if it goes down, he gets to recover his losses in court."), overruled on other grounds by
559 U.S. 1103 (2010); Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Three years is
an age in the stock market. If the suspicious investor had a wide choice of times at which to sue within a threeyear period rather than being required to sue no more than one year after the earliest possible date, the
opportunistic use of federal securities law to protect investors against market risk would be magnified. These
plaintiffs waited patiently to sue. If the stock rebounded from the cellar they would have investment profits, and
if it stayed in the cellar they would have legal damages. Heads I win, tails you lose."); Nerman v. Alexander Grant
& Co., 926 F.2d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Perhaps it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to take a 'wait and see'
approach. But that election did not toll the statute of limitations. That is precisely the point of the statute of
limitations: the plaintiffs had five years to 'wait and see,' and to decide whether to sue for fraud or live with the
less-than-promised deal."); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 440 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Ifthe investor can
wait before selecting the relief he wants, he can shift all of the ordinary investment risk to the defendant. If things
turn out well, the investor will keep the gains and still demand as damages the difference between the prices of
the stock and its market value on the day of the transaction; if things turn out poorly the investor will demand
rescission. Yet once the investor discovers the fraud, he has an ordinary investment decision to make with respect
to the future-to keep (or recover) the stock in hope of gain or to disinvest. Allowing a belated election between
market damages and rescission effectively allows him to do both, and therefore visits defendants with expected
damages greater than the loss the investor actually suffered.").
55. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 758 (1975).
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people may have accepted jobs with it, dozens of lenders may have extended credit to it,
56
and scores of firms may have entered business partnerships with it." As a result of a
firm's liability, "those investments may be forfeited, those jobs may be lost, those loans
57
may not be repaid, and those business partnerships may collapse."
Limitations periods' important functions-preventing the use of stale evidence and
eliminating the uncertainty surrounding potential litigation-explain why limitations
periods have been part of the architecture of civil litigation for centuries, "found and
approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence." 58 Not only is their concept an aged
one, but they appear universal as well, present in every country, every state, and for every
action. 59 Chief Justice Marshall once stated that an action without a statutory deadline
"would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws." 60 It is no surprise then that the
61
securities laws have timeliness bars as well.
B. The GeneralModels ofLimitations Periods
Before discussing the timeliness bars particular to the securities laws, some general
background on timeliness bars is useful. All timeliness rules will bar an action that does
not meet the rule's time limits regardless of the merits of the case. 62 All timeliness bars
have three basic elements: (1) their length, or the period for which they run; 63 (2) the date
56. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J.
453, 467 (1997).
57. Id.
58. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); see also Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, InterpretingFederal
Statutes ofLimitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REv. 493, 507-08 (2004) (describing the "seminal statute of limitations,
the statute of James I" as the basis for many American limitations periods); Ugo Colella, The Casefor Borrowing
a LimitationsPeriodfor Deemed-DenialSuits Brought Pursuantto the Federal Tort Claims Act, 35 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 391, 420 (1998) ("Statutes of limitations are so widely accepted, the principle of repose so revered, and
the truth-seeking function of Article III courts so important that, in an uninterrupted line of cases dating back to
1830, the Supreme Court has held that if federal statutes that confer federal rights on civil litigants are silent on
the limitations question, courts should borrow from and apply analogous state or federal statutes of limitations.");
Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1177-79 (1950) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law] (discussing limitations periods' Roman-law and English-law roots).
59. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 56, at 454 ("Statutes of limitation are an important feature of the legal
landscape. Virtually every country has them. Their direct antecedents can be traced back for centuries, and some
sorts of time limits have been enforced for thousands of years. Today, they are ubiquitous; California alone has
thousands of them."); Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class
Actions, 58 FLA. L. REv. 803, 810 (2006) ("All fifty states have enacted statutes of limitations that specify the
time periods in which claimants may file suit for civil wrongs, such as torts and breach of contract.").
60. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 342 (1805) (remarking on the absurdity of extending indefinitely liability
for a common-law debt).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (providing a one-year statute of limitations and a three-year statute of repose for
claims brought under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (providing a two-year statute of
limitations and five-year statute of repose for claims brought under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
62. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014) ("Statutes of limitations and statutes
of repose both are mechanisms used to limit the temporal extent or duration of liability for tortious acts. Both
types of statute can operate to bar a plaintiff s suit, and in each instance time is the controlling factor."); Kavanagh
v. Noble, 332 U.S. 355, 539 (1947) ("[Limitations] periods are established to cut off rights, justifiable or not, that
might otherwise be asserted and they must be strictly adhered to by the judiciary."); Leffingwell v. Warren, 67
U.S. 599, 606 (1862) (stating that statutes of limitations are statutes of repose).
63. Setting a limitations period involves considering a host of concerns, including the "difficulty of
investigating potential violations, the possibility that consequences of wrongdoing will be delayed, the
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that triggers their running; and (3) the legal excuses available when someone blows those
statutory deadlines (equitable tolling, estoppel, and forfeiture and waiver). 64 In general,
three kinds of statutory timeliness bars exist that vary in the rigidity with which these
elements are applied. The three kinds of timeliness bars include statutes of limitations,
statutes of repose, and jurisdictional time limits. 65 And, as recently declared by the
Supreme Court, these timeliness bars emphasize different aspects of the purposes of
limitations periods. 6 6
1. Statutes ofLimitations
Statutes of limitations are the least rigid of the three kinds of limitations periods. First,
statutes of limitations are usually shorter than statutes of repose, 67 but they usually trigger
upon a flexible date, generally either when the elements of a cause of action accrue 68 or
when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the claim. 69 That is, the date the
opportunities for wrongdoers to conceal the wrong, the rate at which evidence of wrongdoing and also evidence
pertinent to the alleged wrongdoer's defenses is likely to decay, the sophistication of the relevant tribunals in
handling stale evidence, the desirability of freeing court time for fresh claims, the interest of potential defendants
in repose-that is, in knowing after a definite period has passed that they no longer have to worry about being
sued-and the effect on the deterrence of statutory violators of reducing the time for bringing suit." Short v.
Belleville Shoe Mfg., Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990).
64. See J.E. Liss & Co. v. Levin, 201 F.3d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 2000) ("A statute of repose and a statute of
limitations are ordinary defenses to liability, differing from each other only in length, accrual, and tolling rules."),
abrogatedon other grounds by Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Ehud Guttel & Michael
T. Novick, A New Approach to Old Cases: Reconsidering Statutes of Limitation, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 129, 135
(2004) (explaining that all limitations periods have two basic elements: accrual and consequences of delay).
65. The phrase "statutes of limitations" is often used as the collective term for all legal deadlines. 51 AM.
JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions § 2 (2014). This is the case for the securities laws as well. See, e.g., Police & Fire
Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 106 n.13 (2d Cir. 2013). Statutes of limitations,
however, are best understood as a subset of legal timeliness bars that include statutes of limitations, statutes of
repose, and jurisdictional time limits. Another timeliness bar is the judge-made doctrine of laches. Under that
doctrine, a court may bar suit as untimely where plaintiffs fritter away time to sue while the defendant loses
evidence that is invaluable to a defense. See, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 822 (9th Cir.
1980). That concept is outside the scope of this article, but in short, laches is the most flexible legal deadline
because it has no clear length, allowing for a potentially long period; it has no set trigger, providing further
flexibility; and its application is governed by rules of equity, thereby incorporating all available equitable reasons
for tolling. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 58, at 1184-85.
66. See CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2182 (describing the differences between statutes of limitations and statutes
of repose and the different goal served by these distinctions).
67. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (imposing a two-year limit from discovery of a violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and a five-year cap after a violation), and 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (imposing a three-year limit from
discovery of an ERISA violation and a six-year cap after a violation), with 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (imposing a threeyear limit from discovery of a violation of the False Claims Act and a six-year cap after a violation). See also
Hinkle by Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing Illinois' medical-malpractice
statute under 735 ILCS 5/13-212, which provides a shorter time limit from discovery of a violation capped by an
outer time limit triggered based on the violation as "an excellent example of how statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose operate").
68. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Accrual is the date on which
the statute of limitations begins to run."); Jenna M. Fischer, The Limits of Statutes of Limitations, 16 Sw. U. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1986) ("Accrual denotes the point when an action can be maintained.").
69. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions § 126 (2014) (collecting cases and explaining that for statutes
of limitations, "[t]ime begins to run ... when, and only when, the cause or right of action has accrued or arisen");
City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Since the purpose is to
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limitations period begins to run is adjusted according to what the plaintiff knew (or should
have known) and when, as well as the facts of the particular case. Also, statutes of
limitations are generally subject to the full gamut of legal excuses when one misses the
statutory deadline, including equitable tolling, equitable estoppel, and forfeiture and waiver
(which are fully explained in the following section). 70 The Supreme Court has said that
statute of limitations predominately serves the "stale evidence" rationale, requiring the
plaintiff to diligently prosecute claims. 7 1
2. Statutes ofRepose
Statutes of repose are less generous than statutes of limitations. Although they are
longer than statutes of limitations, 72 statutes of repose are triggered by an event certain,
which does not depend on the plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge.7 3 In other
words, a statute of repose may bar a claim even though the plaintiff never knew he had

prevent stale claims, it would make no sense for a statute of limitations to begin to run before the plaintiff even
has a claim: A claim that has not yet accrued could never be considered stale. Thus, in the limitations context, it
makes sense to link the standard for 'discovering' the facts of a violation to the plaintiff's ability to make out or
plead that violation. Only after a plaintiff can adequately plead his claim can that claim be said to have accrued,
and only after a claim has accrued can the statute of limitations on that claim begin to run."); Guttel & Novick,
supra note 64, at 136-37 (explaining that statutes of limitations traditionally contain a discovery rule). The
discovery rule protects victims who do not know they are injured and reasonably do not investigate whether they
have been injured. Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1222 (2013) ("Most of us do not live in a state of constant
investigation; absent any reason to think we have been injured, we do not typically spend our days looking for
evidence that we were lied to or defrauded. And the law does not require that we do so. Instead, courts have
developed the discovery rule, providing that the statute of limitations in fraud cases should typically begin to run
only when the injury is or reasonably could have been discovered.").
70. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) ("Ordinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time
limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant's answer or in an amendment thereto."); Young v. United States,
535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) and United States v.
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998)) ("It is hornbook law that limitations periods are 'customarily subject to
'equitable tolling' unless tolling would be 'inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute."').
71. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2183 ("Statutes of limitations require plaintiffs to pursue diligent prosecution
of known claims. . . . Statutes of limitations promote justice by preventing surprises through [plaintiffs'] revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
72. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681(p) (imposing a two-year limit from discovery of a violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act with a five-year cap), and 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (imposing a three-year limit from discovery of an
ERISA violation and a six-year cap after a violation), with 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (imposing a three-year limit from
discovery of a violation of the False Claims Act with a six-year cap).
73. See 51 AM. JUR. 2DLimitation ofActions § 4 (2014) (collecting cases and stating that "[t]here is a fixed
beginning and end to the time period which a party has to file a complaint under such a statute [a statute ofrepose].
A statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be brought, but is not related to the accrual of the
cause of action"); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 126 (2014) (collecting cases and stating that a statute
of repose "begins running when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether an action has accrued or whether
any injury has resulted; once the statute of repose has expired, the potential plaintiff no longer has a recognized
right of action to redress any harm that has been done. Statutes of repose do not incorporate the discovery rule
and generally terminate claims regardless of a plaintiff's lack of knowledge of his or her cause of action"); see
also City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Unlike a statute of
repose, which begins to run from the defendant's violation, a statute of limitations cannot begin to run until the
plaintiff's claim has accrued.").
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one. 74 Because the statute of repose is triggered by an event certain, and not some malleable
date, courts often explain statutes of repose as less of a procedural mechanism and more of
a substantive right to repose for defendants, "extinguish[ing] a plaintiffs cause of action
after the passage of a fixed period of time." 75 Statutes of repose may work in tandem with
a statute of limitations to cap the flexible date when the statutes of limitation are
triggered. 76 Statutes of repose are more rigid in another respect. Only circumstances
outlined by the statute are sufficient to excuse a statutorily tardy filing. 77
Statutes of repose, like statutes of limitations, encourage plaintiffs to bring timely
actions (the "stale evidence" rationale). But statutes of repose target a different actor than
do statutes of limitations. 78 Statutes of repose, which are unconcerned with the plaintiff's
diligence or any circumstances whatsoever that may hinder timely filing, illustrate a
legislative judgment that the defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively
determined period has lapsed. 79 Thus, statutes of repose serve the second rationale of
limitations periods, the "litigation uncertainty" rationale explained above.

74. See Yates v. Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC, 744 F.3d 874, 898 (4th Cir. 2014) ("[T]hat plaintiffs did not
know that the registration statement was effective as of January 14 is of no consequence for statute of repose
purposes."); In re Exxon Mobil Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[S]tatutes of repose start
upon the occurrence of a specific event and may expire before a plaintiff discovers he has been wronged or even
before damages have been suffered at all."); P. Stolz Family P'ship LP v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102-03 (2d Cir.
2004) (explaining that the statute of repose begins to run "even if the plaintiff has not yet, or could not yet have,
discovered that she has a cause of action").
75. Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010); see also
Margoilies v. Deason, 464 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Statutes of limitations speak to matters of remedy,
whereas statutes of repose eliminate the underlying rights when they lapse."); Wuliger v. Owens, 365 F. Supp.
2d 838, 844 (N.D. Ohio 2005) ("Unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose ... extinguish the claim and
'rest[ ] on the time from some initiating event unrelated to an injury.').
76. See Serafin v. Seith, 672 N.E.2d 302, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) ("[T]he period of repose [in a medicalmalpractice action] gives effect to a policy different from that advanced by a period of limitations; the purpose of
a statute of repose is to impose a cap on the applicability of the discovery rule so that the outer limit terminates
the possibility of liability after a definite period of time, regardless of a potential plaintiffs lack of knowledge of
his cause of action."); Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174, 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that the productliability repose period "sets a cap on the maximum time limit allowed for the commencement of an action without
expanding the regular statute of limitations or reasonable time period for providing notice applicable to the
underlying cause of action").
77. See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014) ("Statutes of limitations, but not statutes of
repose, are subject to equitable tolling ... Statutes of repose, on the other hand, generally may not be tolled, even
in cases of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control."); Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit
v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[A] statute of repose is subject [only] to legislatively
created exceptions . . . and not to equitable tolling.") (internal citations omitted); McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663
F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The rule in the federal courts is that both tolling doctrines-equitable estoppel
and equitable tolling-are . . . grafted on to federal statutes of limitations," but "neither tolling doctrine applies
to statutes of repose; their very purpose is to set an outer limit unaffected by what the plaintiff knows.").
78. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2183.
79. See id. ("Statutes of repose also encourage plaintiffs to bring actions in a timely manner, and for many
of the same reasons. But the rationale has a different emphasis. Statutes of repose effect a legislative judgment
that a defendant should 'be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time.' . . . Like a
discharge in bankruptcy, a statute of repose can be said to provide a fresh start or freedom from liability. Indeed,
the Double Jeopardy Clause has been described as 'a statute of repose' because it in part embodies the idea that
at some point a defendant should be able to put past events behind him.").
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3. JurisdictionalTime Limits
Jurisdictional time limits are most unforgiving. They can be as short as a matter of
days; a certain date triggers them; and almost no situations will excuse a late filing. 80 Their
inflexibility likely explains why jurisdictional time limits appear to be the exception rather
than the rule. As a general matter, timeliness bars will not detract from a court's
adjudicatory power. 8 1 A limitations period is jurisdictional only if explicit in the statute. 82
C. The Securities Laws'HybridLimitationsPeriods
The securities laws contain both statutes of limitations and repose that work in tandem
to allow investors enough time to discover and file their claims but also to cap the time for
defendants' liability. 83 The securities laws' limitations periods are not jurisdictional. 84
The securities laws' limitations periods are a chief aspect of securities regulation.
With the enactment of the federal securities laws, Congress established measures to protect
investors from fraudulent behavior. These consist of mandatory disclosure of material
information as well as certain antifraud remedies embodied in the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. With both laws, Congress sought to protect
investors by allowing them to make autonomous, fully informed investment decisions. 85

80. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,205-06 (2007) (holding that the timely filing of a notice of appeal
is jurisdictional and triggered upon entry of the judgment or order appealed from, that an error "of jurisdictional
magnitude" cannot be forfeited or waived, and the Court "has no authority to create equitable exceptions to
jurisdictional requirements"); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008) (holding
that the limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 for claims under the purview of the U.S. Federal Claims Court is
jurisdictional and is not subject to tolling, waiver, or estoppel); Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446,
451 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that jurisdictional limitations periods are not subject to equitable estoppel or equitable
tolling).
81. See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004) (holding that the Equal Access to Justice Act's
30-day deadline for attorney-fee applications is not jurisdictional, but a claim-processing rule); Kontrickv. Ryan,
540 U.S. 443, 454-55 (2004) (holding that rules governing time limits for creditors to file objections to a
bankruptcy discharge are not jurisdictional, but claims-processing rules); Wis. Valley Imps. Co. v. United States,
569 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Timely suit is a condition of relief, to be sure, but time limits in litigation do
not detract from a court's adjudicatory competence.").
82. See, e.g., 51 AM. JUR. 2DLimitation ofActions § 12 (2014) (collecting cases and stating that "[a] statute
of limitations generally is not jurisdictional, or erects no jurisdictional bar, since a statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense that is waived if it is not pleaded. The bar of a statute of limitations does not go to the court's
jurisdiction to hear a case, and an expired statute of limitations thus does not deprive the trial court ofjurisdiction.
A statute, however, may explicitly state otherwise, by referring to jurisdiction, and thereby provide ajurisdictional
requirement.").
83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77m (summarizing the limitation of actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (describing
when a private right of action can be brought); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633,650 (2010) (referring
to the two- and five-year limitations periods applicable to Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) claims as a two-year
statute of limitations and a five-year statute of repose); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 361 (1991) (referring to the one- and three-year limitations periods applicable to Section 11 and
Section 12 claims as a one-year statute of limitations and a three-year statute of repose).
84. See Eriline Co. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654 n.8 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that the limitations period that
applies to Section 10(b) claims is not jurisdictional); Hays v. Adam, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(stating that the limitations period under Section 13 is not jurisdictional).
85. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("A fundamental
purpose, common to [the securities laws], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.").
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The federal securities laws demand that those with the greatest degree of access to
information disclose that information to the investing public. 86 Yet, so as not to deter
honest and productive business practices, Congress was cautious not to require too much
disclosure. Instead, the securities laws require disclosure of only material facts-those that
have a substantial likelihood to influence the investment decision of the objective,
reasonable investor.87
To ensure that those with access to information are accurately disclosing it to
investors, the securities laws provide broad antifraud remedies for materially misleading
statements. The most commonly invoked antifraud remedies under the securities laws are
those under Section 11 of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 88 But investors
cannot bring these claims whenever they choose. Private antifraud remedies are governed
by the securities laws' statutes of limitations and repose.89
1. The One- and Three-Year Limitations Period Under Section 13 of 1933 Act

The 1933 Act regulates distributions of securities in the primary market (e.g., initial
public offerings). The 1933 Act requires those selling most kinds of securities to register
them, and the Act makes it unlawful to distribute and sell securities with materially fibs in
the registration statement. 90 Thus, the 1933 Act seeks to provide investors with sufficient
material information regarding securities that are offered for sale and to prohibit deceit by
the offerees. 9 1 The 1933 Act regulates the primary offering of securities by granting a
private right of action under Section 11 to stock purchasers against those who make
material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement of an IPO. 92
86. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (explaining that the purposes of one of
the securities laws, the Williams Act, is to ensure that shareholders who are confronted with a cash tender offer
are not required to respond to the offer without adequate information).
87. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,234 (1988) (explaining that the purpose of the materiality
requirement is to exclude information that an investor would deem unimportant).
88. See Securities ClassAction Filings:2013 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 7 (2014), available
at
http://www.comerstone.com/getattachment/d88bd527-25b5-4c54-8d40-2bl3da0d0779/Securities-Class
action-Filings-2013-Year-in-Revie.aspx (demonstrating that from 2009 to 2013, the largest percentage of total
filings include rule 1Ob-5 claims and Section 11 claims as compared to lawsuits without any such claims).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 77m; 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(a)(2).
91. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (explaining that a purpose of the 1933
Act was protecting investors against fraud).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. The elements of a claim under Section 11 are: (1) an omission or misrepresentation,
(2) of a material fact required to be stated or necessary to make other statements made not misleading, (3) in a
registration statement, (4) that resulted in damages. See e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 358 F. Supp.
2d 189, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Scienter, reliance, and loss causation are not positive elements of a Section 11
claim. See e.g., Panther Partners, Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2012). Loss causation
is an affirmative defense to a § 11 claim. 15 U.S.C. § 771(b). Liability under Section 11 may seem heavy-handed,
but it is tempered by the defendant's affirmative defense of due diligence, in which defendants other than the
securities issuer itself may avoid liability by proving that, after a reasonable investigation, they had no grounds
to believe that the parts of the registration statement attributed to them contained any falsehoods. 15 U.S.C. §
77k(b)(3). In addition, to prevent issuers from skirting registration, Section 12(a)(1) provides a cause of action
against those who sell unregistered securities that were required to be registered. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1). See also
Shuman v. Sherman, 356 F. Supp. 911, 917 (D. Md. 1973) (stating that Section 12(a)(1) "exists for the
prophylactic purpose of insuring registration"). The elements of a Section 12(a)(1) claim include: "(1) a sale or
offer of sale of securities by the defendant"; "(2) the absence of a registration statement" or failure to meet

2014]

Leave Time for Trouble

161

Section 13 of the 1933 Act governs the timeliness bars of Section 11 claims and
contains a one-year statute of limitations and a three-year statute of repose. 93 That statute
provides that actions under Section 11 must be brought (1) within one year from the time
of discovery of the untrue statement or omission, or from the time that discovery should
have been made in the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (2) in no case more than three
years after the security was first offered to the public. 94 A discovery rule is grafted onto
the one-year limitations period for Section 11 claims. That is, by statute, the one-year
statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery, which means (1) when the
plaintiff did in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have
discovered, the facts constituting the violation-whichever comes first. 95 The statute
triggers upon constructive (not just actual) discovery because it is arguably quite simple to
uncover an untrue statement in a registration statement or prospectus. 96
The three-year statute of repose begins running from when the security is first bona
fide offered to the public, which, for Section-11 claims, is typically the date of an effective
registration statement filed with the SEC. 97 An example illustrates this rule. In Yates v.
Municipal Mortgage & Equity LLC, in 2008, investors sued claiming that a registration
statement and a prospectus for a 2005 secondary public offering contained false and
misleading statements. 98 The SEC declared the registration statement effective in midJanuary 2005, which meant that the investors' complaint was untimely by about two weeks,
even though the investors did not know the registration was effective on that date. 99
2. The Two- and Five-Year LimitationsPeriodfor Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
The 1934 Act, like the 1933 Act, aims to ensure that stock issuers disseminate
adequate information to investors so that they can make informed investment decisions.
But, unlike the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act addresses disclosure of information that affects the

prospectus requirements; "(3) the use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce in connection with sale or
offer." Ellison v. Am. Image Motor Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d 628, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Moreover, Section 12(a)(2)
addresses all other forms of materially incorrect or misleading selling literature and oral communications in the
sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2). The elements of a claim under Section 12 (a)(2) are: (1) an omission or
misrepresentation (2) of a material fact required to be stated or necessary to make other statements made not
misleading, (3) in a prospectus or oral communication, (4) of which the plaintiff was unaware, (5) that resulted in
damages. See, e.g., Miller v. Thane, 519 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating the elements a plaintiff must show
to win under Section 12(a)(2)); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 567 (1995) (holding that an oral
communication is only actionable if it relates to the prospectus).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77m. When differentiating these two time limits, the former is called a statute of limitations
and "the latter is called a statute of repose." Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 13
Civ. 6705, 2014 WL 241739, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
95. Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d
263, 273 (2013) (citing Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010)).
96. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 658 (2010) (explaining that the constructive
discovery rule may be easier to apply to § 77m claims).
97. See, e.g., Yates v. Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC, 744 F.3d 874, 895-98 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining
different court interpretations of what "bona fide offering date" refers to and concluding that the effective date of
the registration statement is the "bona fide offering date"); P. Stolz Family P'ship LP v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92,99100 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the bona fide offering date is the date of registration).
98. Yates, 744 F.3d at 894.
99. Id at 898.
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secondary market where investors buy or sell securities from other investors rather than the
issuing companies themselves (e.g., stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange). The
1934 Act imposes a duty on various securities issuers, dealers, and exchanges to register
and report information about securities to the investing public. 10 0 Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act also contains language from which courts have recognized an implied private right of
action for materially misleading statements or omissions in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security in violation of Rule lOb-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 10 1
Claims under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 are governed by a two-year statute of
limitations and a five-year statute of repose. 10 2 The limitations statute provides:
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the
securities laws .. . may be brought not later than the earlier of-(1) 2 years after
the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such
violation. 103

100. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 f, n, o(d), 0-1, q, s (2011) (explaining that "an exchange may be registered as
a national securities exchange," requiring proxies to follow specific requirements, requiring issuers to file
registration, explaining effective broker and dealer registration, requiring every national securities exchange
member, broker or deal to register and keep records, and requiring the Commission to publish notice of filings of
application and receive comments).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The first case implying a private remedy under Rule lOb-5 was Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The private right of action under Rule lob-5 is
now "beyond peradventure." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); see also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (describing the judicially implied private right of action
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule lOb-5 as a "judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acom"); SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (observing that claims under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws"). The elements of
a claim for securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 include: "(1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation." Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). Historically, the Rule lob-5 claim was judicially implied, and as a result, there
was no accompanying statutory time limit. Courts, "faced with the awkward task of discerning the limitations
period that Congress intended ... to apply to a cause of action it really never knew existed," implied the applicable
period using one of four alternatives: (1) the one- and three-year period under Section 13 of the 1933 Act; (2) the
forum state's limitations' period under the common law of fraud; (3) the forum state's "blue sky law" limitations
period; or (4) the limitations periods applicable to Section 9(e), Section 16(b) or Section 18(a) claims under the
1934 Act. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Measure ofRepose: The Statute ofLimitations
for Securities Fraud,52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1547, 1559 (2011). In Lampf, the Court held that claims under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 were governed by a one-year statute of limitations and the threeyear statute of repose applicable to Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 n.9 (1991). Corporate scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia,
however, caused Congress to lengthen the period to its current two- and five-year structure. See, e.g., S. REP. No.
107-146, at 8 (2002).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). In 2002, Congress responded to corporate scandals in Enron, Worldcom, and
Adelphia, which shook investor confidence, by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. SOX created
stringent reporting requirements aimed at perceived lax corporate oversight. First, SOX required principal
executive officers to certify that certain reports contained no false or misleading information. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a). Second, SOX provided criminal penalties if the CEO knowingly certified false
information. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c). Finally, SOX mandated that each annual report filed by a company contain a

2014]

Leave Time for Trouble

163

Like Section 13, the statute of limitations for Section 10(b) claims contains a
discovery provision. Although the statute does not expressly reference constructive
discovery, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to run "(1) when the plaintiff did
in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, 'the
facts constituting the violation'-whichever comes first."104 The "facts constituting the
violation" include, at a minimum, (1) the statements made were false, material facts were
omitted, or other acts that constitute the breach existed; and (2) the defendant acted with
scienter. 10 5
The time limit that applies to Section 10(b) claims is slightly longer than the time limit
that applies to Section 11 claims. Additional time is justified because investors bringing
claims under Section 10(b) must allege facts with particularity and a "strong inference" of
scienter, 10 6 that is, enough facts for a district judge to find "cogent and compelling" 10 7 the
inference that the defendant acted with intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. 108 The
longer period gives investors more time to try to meet this higher pleading burden. 109 To
report on internal controls established to guard against fraud. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)-(b). SOX also expanded the
limitations periods that apply to most private remedies under the securities laws, providing a two-year statute of
limitations and a five-year statute of repose. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). In its report on SOX, the Senate Judiciary
Committee expressed concern that the one- and three-year structure "unfairly limit[ed] recovery for defrauded
investors in some cases," noting that some states were forced to forgo their claims against Enron, for example,
because of the statute of limitations. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 8 (2002). The Committee was also concerned that
the complexity and nature of securities fraud made these claims difficult to detect. Id at 9. Additionally, the
Committee observed that plaintiffs faced significant procedural obstacles under the PSLRA, including its leadplaintiff selection process, its stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss-"consideration of which can take
over a year in itself '-and its heightened pleading standards. Id. at 9-10. The Committee worried that by the time
plaintiff-investors learned enough facts to file a complaint capable of surviving a motion to dismiss and to begin
discovery, the claim was likely to be time barred. Id. at 9. To allow plaintiffs time to adequately investigate their
claims and to file meritorious suits, the Committee proposed, and Congress accepted, lengthening the limitations
period. Id. at 9-10.
104. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 637 (2010).
105. Id. Whether reliance, damages, and loss causation also constitute "the violation" is an open question.
See also McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing this open question and
concluding that the "violation" does not include injury or economic loss); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys.
v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that after Merck, what facts constitute a securitiesfraud violation remains unresolved).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
107. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
108. Merck & Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at 657-58 ("There is good reason ... for providing an actual-discovery rule
for private § 10(b) claims but providing (explicitly) a constructive-discovery rule for claims governed by [§ 11
and § 12]: The elements of § 10(b) claims, which include scienter, are likely more difficult to discover than the
elements of claims under [§ 11 and § 12], which do not ... And a constructive-discovery standard may be easier
to apply to the claims covered by [§ 11 and § 12]. Determining when the plaintiff should have uncovered an
untrue assertion in a registration statement or prospectus is much simpler than assessing when a plaintiff should
have learned that the defendant deliberately misled him using a deceptive device covered by § 10(b).").
109. See Elizabeth Cosenza, Dura-Tion: A New Paradigmfor Construing the Statute of Limitations in
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 718 (2010) ("Keenly aware of the additional and
unprecedented pleading burdens that it had imposed on securities fraud plaintiffs when it passed the PSLRA,
Congress enacted Section 804(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 to give plaintiffs additional time to develop
the particularized facts necessary to plead a strong inference of scienter as to each possible defendant."); MICHAEL
J. KAUFMAN, 26 SECURrTIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 5B:2 (2013) ("Another possible benefit to plaintiffs . .. is
that the 2/5 will allow more time to try to meet the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's heightened pleading
requirements (thought these might even be substantively easier to meet now as well). Now there is more time for
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illustrate, in Merck & Co., Inc., v. Reynolds, investors sued a pharmaceutical manufacturer
claiming it made false statements about medical risks of one of its blockbuster drugs in
November 2003.110 The defendants argued that the statutory clock started more than two
years earlier as the result of a published research study, other products-liability lawsuits,
and an FDA warning letter.1 11 The Court concluded that these events did not show that the
investors should have discovered the facts constituting securities fraud because the events
did nothing to show that the drug maker was making any false statements with intent to
defraud, manipulate, or deceive the investing public. 112
The securities laws' time limits with discovery provisions purport to provide a shorter
time to sue and thus a more attractive method for getting claims dismissed. Most of the
time, however, discovery provisions impair the effectiveness of limitations periods.
Discovery provisions in general are characterized by the defense groan-causing phrase
"fact intensive." 1l 3 Whether plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered something is
often a question that itself requires some discovery, which means that time-barred claims
are less and less likely to be disposed of on a motion to dismiss. 114
III. TOLLING PRINCIPLES TO ARREST THE SECURITIES LAWS' LIMITATIONS PERIODS
The sanction for failing to comply with the time set by a limitations period is severe:
Investors lose their day in court. At times, however, depriving one of access to the courts
because of an arbitrary deadline is simply too severe a sanction. Certain circumstances may
excuse a late complaint and the statutory clock will not run, it will be stopped or tolled.115
Four doctrines identify circumstances where tolling applies. First, equitable tolling applies
when it is unfair to hold the plaintiff to the statutory deadline because of some extraordinary
event that impeded the plaintiffs compliance. Second, equitable estoppel applies when it
is unfair to allow the defendant to benefit from the statutory deadline because of something
the defendant did to prevent a timely suit. Third, forfeiture applies when the parties have
acted as if the case need not operate under the statutory deadlines. Fourth, waiver applies
vital information to surface in order to try to establish a cause of action that can meet those standards, in some
cases, up to five years for information to surface."); Tony Mauro, Merck ShareholderSuit Timely, JusticesRule,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=12-2453295741/MerckShareholder-Suit-Timely-Justices-Rule?Slreturn=20141005154758 (access required) (quoting David Frederick
of Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, who argued and won the case for Merck shareholders, as stating
that Merck is especially significant because scienter is "usually the hardest part of the securities fraud to find out
about").
110. Merck& Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at633.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 653-54.
113. Cf Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(characterizing the former standard for discovery-"inquiry notice"-under Rule 10b-5's limitations period as
one involving "disputed factual issues"); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating
that the securities laws' limitations periods are "fact-specific" and that the court is "decidedly reluctant to
foreclose such claims as untimely absent a manifest indication that plaintiffs 'could have learned' the facts
underpinning their allegations" earlier).
114. See, e.g., Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 56, at 496 ("[G]iven the complexity of existing limitation rules
and the manner in which they have evolved, it has become increasingly difficult to dispose of time-barred claims
as a threshold or preliminary matter (that is, by demurrer or summary judgment) rather than at trial.").
115. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) ("Time requirements in lawsuits between
private litigants are customarily subject to 'equitable tolling."').
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when the parties have explicitly agreed that their case need not operate under legal
deadlines.
As shown in this part, case law interpreting the securities laws generally does not
allow for equitable tolling or estoppel. Even forfeiture applies only to toll the securities
laws' statutes of limitations and not statutes of repose. Touched on in this section, but
explained in more depth in Part V, the only tolling circumstance that applies uniformly is
waiver by tolling agreement.
A. Equitable Tolling
Equitable tolling refers to the situation in which the litigant has been pursuing rights
diligently, but some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely discovery or prosecution
of the claim. 116 The standard example is where, despite the plaintiffs diligence, the
plaintiff could not discover the wrongdoer's identity or the facts essential to show an
actionable wrong. 117 Diligence is a prerequisite to equitable tolling. 118 As long as a
plaintiff acted diligently, equitable tolling can apply in a variety of situations, including
where the defendant in a fraud case has successfully concealed the fraud and prevented
discovery. 119
Equitable tolling does not depend on the defendant's conduct. 120 As an example,
equitable tolling may be appropriate if the plaintiff diligently pursued his rights, filed a
timely but defective pleading, and was assured by a judicial officer that the defect would
not act as a bar. 12 1 Equitable tolling may be appropriate if other circumstances rendered
the plaintiff incapable of suing on time. Perhaps the plaintiff was waiting for the court to

116. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1419 (2012) ("Generally, a
litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.").
117. See, e.g., Williams v. Sims, 390 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[E]quitable tolling, refers to situations
in which, without fault by the defendant, the plaintiff is unable to sue within the statutory period. The standard
example is where despite the exercise of due diligence the plaintiff simply cannot discover the wrongdoer's
identity, or facts essential to show that there was an actionable wrong, within the statutory period.").
118. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofLaw, 110 HARV. L. REv. 991, 1007 (1997) ("[l]f a man
neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example.").
119. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946) (stating that when a party injured by
fraud "remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part
of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party"). Fraudulent concealment
is conduct beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiffs claim is filed. See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Equitable estoppel in the limitations setting is sometimes called
fraudulent concealment, but must not be confused with efforts by a defendant in a fraud case to conceal the fraud.
To the extent that such efforts succeed, they postpone the date of accrual by preventing the plaintiff from
discovering that he is a victim of a fraud. They are thus within the domain of the discovery rule. Fraudulent
concealment in the law of limitations presupposes that the plaintiff has discovered, or, as required by the discovery
rule, should have discovered, that the defendant injured him, and denotes efforts by the defendant-above and
beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff's claim is founded-to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.").
120. See, e.g., Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Equitable tolling does not
depend on the defendant's wrongful conduct; rather, it focuses on whether the plaintiffs delay was excusable.").
121. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989) (stating that "where a party has performed
an act which, if properly done, would [meet] the deadline . . . and has received specific assurance by a judicial
officer that that this act has been properly done," then the deadline will not act as a bar).
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appoint counsel, possibly the plaintiff received inadequate notice, 122 maybe the plaintiff
died and the estate needed a reasonable amount of time to appoint a proper
representative, 123 or, by chance, the plaintiff was from a country at war with the
defendant's country.1 24
Equitable-tolling principles will interrupt statutes of limitations for some claims1 25
but not for claims under the securities laws. That is, equitable tolling does not apply to the
securities laws' statutes of limitations. 126 The reason for this special treatment is that the
securities laws' statutes of limitations build in equitable principles by virtue of their
discovery provisions. 127 Based on Lampf Pleva, Lipkind,Prupis& Petigrowv. Gilbertson,
courts will not toll the securities laws' statutes of limitations for equitable reasons. 128 In
Lampf the Court addressed whether equitable tolling was available for claims governed by
Section 13's one- and three-year limitations period. 129 In that case, in 1986, investors sued
a law firm for conduct between 1979 and 1981. The investors claimed that the law firm
wrote false opinion letters incorporated in offering statements that touted tax benefits of
122. See, e.g., Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (concluding that there was
no reason to equitably toll limitations period because "this is not a case in which a claimant has received
inadequate notice ... or where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling
the statutory period until the motion is acted upon").
123. See Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 325 (1889) ("[Ilf a man dies after commencing an action,
and it abates by his death, and the limitation of time for bringing another action expires before the appointment
of an executor or administrator, the courts have held that as there is no person to bring suit, the statute is suspended
for a reasonable period, in order to give an opportunity to those interested to have the proper representative
appointed."); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370-71 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that equitable tolling may be
appropriate where a guardian conspires to deprive a mentally incompetent person of her rights).
124. See, e.g., Amy, 130 U.S. at 324 (stating that limitations periods were tolled by the Civil War); Hangar v.
Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1867) (stating that inevitable occurrences, such as war, could toll statutes of
limitations); Osborne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947) (stating that the limitations period was
arrested for plaintiff who was prisoner of war overseas); see also Hon. Mark C. Dillon, An Overview of Tolls of
Statutes ofLimitations on Account of War: Are They Current and Relevant in the Post-September 11th Era?, 13
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 315, 322-23 (2010) (surveying states and finding that nearly half statutorily
recognize a generalized toll of limitations periods on account of war).
125. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) ("It is hombook law that limitations periods
are customarily subject to equitable tolling.") (quotation omitted).
126. See McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The rule in the federal courts is that
both tolling doctrines-equitable estoppel and equitable tolling-are . . . grafted on to federal statutes of
limitations," but "neither tolling doctrine applies to statutes of repose; their very purpose is to set an outer limit
unaffected by what the plaintiff knows."); Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1997)
("[T]he Supreme Court has held that, given the discovery rule, there is no defense of equitable tolling to the statute
of limitations," and that "[t]he Court [in Lampf] said not that equitable tolling was inconsistent with the one-year
statute of limitations (as it was, the Court held, with the three-year statute ofrepose), but that it was 'unnecessary'
because of the discovery rule. This formulation implies that the rule should be so interpreted as to make equitable
tolling unnecessary to protect investors' interest in having a reasonable, a practical, time within which to sue.");
Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the plain import of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lampf is that "when knowledge or notice is required to start the statute of limitations
running, there is no room for equitable tolling"); Topolian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1135 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating
that Lampfheld that "equitable tolling is not applicable").
127. See McCann, 663 F.3d at 930; Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4
(2d Cir. 2010); Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 494 F.3d 956, 974 (11th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Aljian, 490
F.3d 778, 782 n.13 (9th Cir. 2007).
128. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991).
129. Id.
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investing in certain partnerships. 130 The plaintiffs missed the three-year repose deadline
but sought equitable tolling based on a narrow circumstance: their failure to discover the
alleged fraud within the three-year period. 13 1 The plaintiffs relied on the fact that the IRS
sent notice in late 1982 and 1983 that it was investigating the partnerships, but only later
disallowed the claimed tax benefits. 132 The Court rejected this argument, observing that
Congress already built "equitable tolling" into the statute's one- and three-year limitations
period. 13 3 The Court explained that Section 13 provides a one-year limit from the date of
discovery. This statute of limitations still caps the time to sue at three years when the
plaintiff has difficulty uncovering the claim. 134
Nevertheless, there may be reason to question whether all forms of equitable tolling
should be unavailable to toll the securities laws' statute of limitations. As explained by
securities scholar Harold Bloomenthal:
The aspect of equitable tolling that the Court rejected in Lampf was not directed
at what constitutes discovery under [the statute of limitations], but . . . on the

inconsistency of applying equitable tolling so as to extend the outside three-year
[statute of repose]. The Court in Lampf did not purport to resolve the issue of
when the one year after discovery period of limitations commences. 135
Similarly, equitable principles do not toll a statute ofrepose because repose provisions
set an outer limit unaffected by what the plaintiff knows or does, 136 and the securities laws
are no exception. Indeed, the federal courts are in complete agreement that the securities
laws' statutes of repose begin to run without interruption once the necessary triggering
event has occurred, even if equitable considerations would have otherwise warranted
tolling. 137
B. EquitableEstoppel
Equitable estoppel refers to the situation where the defendants' conduct somehow
prevents the plaintiff from suing. 138 Estoppel stems from the traditional legal maxim that
130. Id. at 352.
131. The plaintiffs argued that tolling was appropriate where "reasonably diligent plaintiffs are unaware of
their claims through no fault of their own, or where defendant have actively concealed the fraud." Brief for
Respondents at 42-43, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Glibertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (No. 90333), 1991 WL 11007794, at *42-43.
132. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 352-53.
133. Id. at 363.
134. Id
135. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, I GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK § 10:115 (2014).
136. McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011); Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010); Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 494 F.3d 956, 974 (1Ith Cir.
2007); Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 782 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2007).
137. P. Stolz Family P'ship LP v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2004); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
2 LAW SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.10[4] (2014) (collecting cases and stating "Section 13 is not only a statute
of limitations but also operates as a statute of repose. There is an absolute maximum of three years in order to
prevent stale claims. The three-year repose period is absolute in that it cannot be extended by applying equitable
tolling principles"); J. WILLIAMS HICKS, 17 CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION § 4:77 (2013)
(collecting cases and stating that the three-year repose period "is an absolute outer limit," and thus "courts have
uniformly refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel").
138. Bain & Colella, supra note 58, at 504 ("Because equitable estoppel prevents a defendant from taking
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one cannot take advantage of one's own wrongs, a principle "older than the country
itself." 139 Perhaps the defendant lulled the plaintiff into letting the deadline pass by
engaging in sham settlement negotiations, 14 0 or by promising not to plead any limitations
defenses. 14 1 Or perhaps the defendant threatened the plaintiff in order to prevent suit. 142
The doctrine also applies when the plaintiff discovered (or should have discovered) the
claim, but the defendant took steps beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff s claim
is founded to stall the suit (referred to as "fraudulent concealment"). 143 In those situations,
a court may prohibit a defendant from raising a timeliness defense.
As a rule, estoppel pauses a deadline set by statutes of limitations. 144 But whether
estoppel arrests the securities laws' statutes of limitations is uncertain. Recall that the
Lampf Court did not address estoppel's application to the securities laws' limitations
periods. It addressed only equitable tolling's application. The federal courts have noticed
that although Lampf forbids suspending the securities laws' limitations provisions via
equitable tolling, Lampf does leave room for suspending the securities laws' statutes of
limitations based on principles of estoppel. 14 5 Therefore, some courts have suggested that
advantage his own wrongdoing, it is, by definition, limited to situations in which the actions of the defendant are
at issue.").
139. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-34 (1959).
140. Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334, 344 (1896); see also Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of
Wisc., 112 F.3d 869, 876 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The most common example of equitable estoppel is where the
defendant asks the plaintiff to delay the filing of his suit pending negotiations aimed at resolving the parties'
dispute out of court."); Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1993) ("If Lehman
had made lulling noises, designed to allay the investors' concerns, the plaintiffs might have been able to arrest
the running of the statute of limitations by pleading equitable estoppel."); Developments in the Law, supra note
58, at 1177-79 ("Originally the doctrine was invoked only if the defendant had misrepresented a present fact,
raising an estoppel in pais. Now, however, the courts often employ what has been loosely termed 'equitable
estoppel' to remove the statutory bar in any situation in which the plaintiff's reasonable failure to sue appears to
result from reliance on any sort of misleading conduct, such as assurances that the obligation would be discharged
without suit, or a request that the plaintiff delay prosecution of the claim.").
141. Glus,359 U.S. at 232-34.
142. Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nev. Nat'l Bank of S.F., 270 U.S. 438,445-46 (1926).
143. See, e.g., Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of Chi., 275 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Equitable estoppel
in the limitations setting is sometimes ... called fraudulent concealment but must not be confused with efforts by
a defendant in a fraud case to conceal fraud. Fraudulent concealment in the law of limitations presupposes that
the plaintiff has discovered or, as required by the discovery rule should have discovered, that the defendant injured
him. It denotes efforts by the defendant, above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiffs claim is
founded, to prevent, by fraud or deception, the plaintiff from suing in time."); Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990).
144. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) ("[F]iling a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that,
like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.").
145. See Tregenza., 12 F.3d at 720-21 ("Lampf holds, it is true, that when knowledge or notice is required to
start the statute of limitations running, there is no room for equitable tolling... . But there may still be room in
such a case for equitable estoppel. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1055 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.),
holds that there is room; Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990), leaves the question
open. Equitable tolling just means that without fault by either party the plaintiff does not have enough information
to sue within the period of limitations, and in the type of statute of limitations that we are discussing the period
of limitations doesn't start until he has the information, making equitable tolling redundant. But the plaintiff might
have the required information-actual knowledge of the violation or inquiry notice, as the case may be-yet be
thwarted from suing in time by misrepresentations or other actions by the defendant; for example, the defendant
might have promised not to plead the statute of limitations."); see also Lyman Johnson, SecuritiesFraudand the
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plaintiffs may arrest the securities laws' statute of limitations based on estoppel principles,
but only until the cap imposed by the statute of repose. 14 6
Turning to estoppel's application to the securities laws' statute of repose, a few courts
have held that estoppel does not arrest repose provisions because those provisions are
unyielding and absolute. 14 7 On the other hand, other courts, however, have suggested
restiveness with this conclusion, 148 and, as explained by Harold S. Bloomenthal, there may
Mirage ofRepose, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 607, 607 (1992) (contending that under Lampf "[o]nly claims of securities
fraud uncomplicated by a later cover-up of the original fraud are free from tolling principles. The limitations
period for fraud which is subsequently concealed by an original wrongdoer remains, because of the still viable
doctrine of fraudulent concealment, subject to tolling."); Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d 863, 869 (9th
Cir. 2008) (observing with approval, post Lampf that "[tjhere is a handful of cases where a defendant's outright
lies and malfeasances prevented an investor who made diligent inquiries from discovering facts known only to
the defendant. In such cases, courts have held that the statute wasn't triggered"), cert. granted,vacated sub nom.
Trainer Wortham & Co. v. Betz, 559 U.S. 1103 (2010). Legal scholarship has noticed this as well. See Roy M.
Van Cleave, The FederalSecurities Acts' One- Year Inquiry Notice Statute ofLimitations: Are the Scales Tipped
Against FraudClaimants?, 22 J. CoRP. L. 79, 89-90 (1996) (collecting cases that find that equitable estoppel
survives Lampf); cf Johnson, supra, at 629-30 (arguing that fraudulent concealment, a variant of equitable
estoppel, should survive Lampf and apply to the securities laws' statutes of repose).
146. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 819, 857-58 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
(collecting case law and explaining that whether Lampfprecludes equitable estoppel is unresolved but concluding
that the "persuasive" approach to allow estoppel to toll the securities laws' statutes of limitations, but not repose);
Friedman v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346-47 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that "the equitable
estoppel doctrine as applied to the one-year from discovery period is not inconsistent with Lampf as long as the
claim is brought within the three-year period of repose," but finding no injustice to support its application in that
case); Beming v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 480, 484 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating that "it is possible
for equitable estoppel to extend the time for filing suit beyond the one-year discovery limitation to the time that
they actually filed suit within the three-year repose period," but finding no grounds to apply the doctrine), revd
on other grounds, 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993).
147. See, e.g., McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The argument for so unbending
a rule is that the risk of error is great when the interval between an alleged wrongful act and its harmful
consequence is a protracted one."); Soley v. Wasserman, No. 08 Civ. 9262, 2010 WL 931888, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 12, 2010) ("Soley's equitable tolling and estoppel arguments are of no moment because the three year limit
is a period of repose . . .and is therefore not subject to tolling, equitable or otherwise."); Del Sontro v. Cendant
Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 574 (D.N.J. 2002) (stating that "equitable estoppel does not prevent Defendant from
raising the repose period as a defense"); Berning v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 480, 484 (N.D. Ill.
1991) ("[I]t is possible for equitable estoppel to extend the time for filing ... suit beyond the one-year discovery
limitation to the time that they actually filed suit within the three-year repose period."); Borden, Inc. v. Spoor
Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the statute of repose was
"an absolute bar" to Section 10(b) claims and equitable estoppel was not available).
148. See, e.g., Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 1301-02 (4th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may have applied to toll Section 13's statute of repose); Anixter v. Home-Stake
Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1436 & n.27 (10th Cir. 1991) (observing that Lampf did not address equitable estoppel
but concluding that Section 13's three-year cap is absolute and not tolled by equitable estoppel, but also stating
that "there may be circumscribed settings in which the doctrine of equitable estoppel might apply to claims
governed by Section 13"), amendedon reh'g, 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991), vacatedon other grounds sub nom.
Dennler v. Trippet, 503 U.S. 978 (1992). Before Lampf, courts concluded that the three-year repose provision
could be extended by virtue of estoppel. See In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337, 344-45 (N.D.
Okla. 1975) (holding that three-year period applicable to Section 12(a)(2) claims was not an absolute bar); see
also Zola v. Gordon, 685 F. Supp. 354, 361 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that In re Home-Stake is "[i]n reality,"
a case in which the court "used equitable estoppel against the defendants" and recognizing that under appropriate
circumstances, equitable estoppel could extend the three-year repose period). Courts have used estoppel to extend
repose periods in other contexts. See Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 1987) (The Commodity
Exchange Act); Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978) (The Interstate Land Sales
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be reason to treat estoppel differently from equitable tolling: "Equitable estoppel, properly
understood, is not inconsistent with the fact that Congress intended the periods of limitation
to be absolute."1 49 Bloomenthal writes, "Congress was attempting to assure directors and
others that, after a period of time, no action would be brought against them for allegedly
false statements made in a registration statement or otherwise in connection with the sale
or purchase of a security. Congress was not saying that by their own subsequent conduct
they could not, in effect, extend the period of limitation."1 50
C. Forfeiture and Waiver
Timeliness defenses are ordinarily viewed as personal, affirmative defenses, 15 1
allowed as a matter of legislative and juristic grace. 152 As a consequence, timeliness
defenses can be forfeited and waived. At the outset, it is appropriate to emphasize the
following: waiver and forfeiture are often used interchangeably, but they are not the
same. 153 Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right (forgoing a defense for
strategic reasons), compared to forfeiture, which is mere conduct inconsistent with the
rights conferred. 154 For example, one can forfeit a defense by acting inconsistently with
the rights conferred by failing to raise the defense, and one can expressly waive the defense
by entering into a tolling agreement. 155

Full Disclosure Act).
149. Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute ofLimitations andRule 10b-5 Claims:A Study in JudicialLassitude,
60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235, 292 (1989).
150. Id. at 292; see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 2 SECURITIES LAw HANDBOOK §
32:24 (2013) ("Congressional intent ... is not so clear with respect to equitable estoppel. Congress did intend a
three-year period of repose, even to the degree of barring claims for fraud, so that participants in securities
transactions (often assumed in the debate to be the board of directors) and their estate had assurance after a definite
period of time ... need not concern themselves that claims might be asserted against them. But this was on the
assumption that the defendant committed acts that should not be called into question years later. Congress was
not saying that a defendant, by his or her own subsequent conduct, could not extend the period of limitations; that
is what the doctrine of equitable estoppel is all about.").
151. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1); see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130,
133 (2008) ("[T]he law typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant must
raise at the pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.").
152. See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) ("Statutes of limitation find their
justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles.
They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from
being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been
lost.... They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has never been regarded as
what now is called a 'fundamental' right or what used to be called a 'natural' right of the individual. He may, of
course, have the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be
good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.").
153. Courts commonly use the word "waiver" when they mean "forfeiture," and this has led to some admitted
difficulty by the judiciary in distinguishing the two terms. E.g., United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th
Cir. 2007).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) ("Waiver is different from forfeiture.
Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment
of abandonment of a known right."').
155. See Lee v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 635 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Like other legal contentions, the benefit
of the statute of limitations may be waived by agreement or by conduct inconsistent with the rights it confers, but
defendants did not waive their right to have these untimely suits dismissed.").
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Litigants can forfeit statutes of limitations. It is a familiar concept in the law that
litigants can forfeit rights-even constitutional ones-by failing to make a timely assertion
of that right before the court having the jurisdiction to determine it.156 Failing to timely
assert a right is conduct inconsistent with the right and a forfeiture of it. The federal courts
have recognized that failing to raise the securities laws' statutes of limitations forfeits that
defense (although the courts often use the term "waiver"). 157 Under case law for statutes
of repose, however, courts generally refuse to find that one may forfeit that defense by
failing to raise it in a pleading.1 58 One may forfeit the benefit of a statute of limitations,
but not a statute of repose because courts view the benefit conferred by statutes of repose
as a "substantive" aspect of the claim, which cannot be forfeited. 159
A special kind of waiver involves tolling agreements. At times, parties agree to toll
timeliness bars to allow additional time to negotiate settlement or explore the merits of
their respective positions. 160 Agreeing to toll timeliness bars can suspend hostilities, spare
parties unnecessary legal costs, and save the court the administrative time and expense of
handling a lawsuit that the parties just want stayed.1 61 It is an arrangement that is beneficial
156. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("No procedural principle is more familiar
to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to
make a timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."); see also Day v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) ("Ordinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited if
not raised in a defendant's answer or an amendment thereto."). Jurisdictional time limits cannot be forfeit or
waived. See, e.g., Tapia-Lemos v. Holder, 696 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that "true jurisdictional rules
are not subject to waiver or forfeiture," and holding that the time limit to seek judicial review of a removal order
was jurisdictional and could not be waived or forfeited).
157. See, e.g., Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2006) ("While Amex did argue
before the district court that the entire original complaint was time-barred because appellants were on inquiry
notice of fraud as of April 2, 2001, we find no record of a claim in the alternative of a statute of limitations defense
specific to Goeltz, Crittenden, and Henry. The failure to raise the specific statute of limitations defense as to
Goeltz, Crittenden, and Henry in the district court waives [read "forfeits"] this defense, and it cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal."); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 751-52 (2d Cir.
1992) ("A claim that a statute of limitations bars a suit is an affirmative defense, and, as such, it is waived [read
"forfeit"] if not raised in the answer to the complaint.").
158. See, e.g., Roskam Baking Co., Inc. v. Lanham Mach. Co., 288 F.3d 895, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that party could not "waive" [read "forfeit"] a statute of repose by failing to raise it in an initial pleading); but see
Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 727, 739-40 (Tenn. 2013) (holding that a party
could "waive" [read "forfeit"] a statute of repose by failing to timely raise it).
159. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Bullock, 605 F. Supp. 2d 251, 260-61 (D.D.C. 2009)
(collecting cases and observing that the statute of repose is a substantive provision and may not be forfeited).
160. See, e.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, Enforcement Manual
§ 3.1.2 (Oct. 2013), availableat http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf ("If the assigned
staff investigating potential violations of the federal securities laws believes that any of the relevant conduct may
be outside the five-year limitations period before the SEC would be able to file or institute an enforcement action,
the staff may ask the potential defendant or respondent to sign a 'tolling agreement.' Such requests are
occasionally made in the course of settlement negotiations to allow time for sharing of information in furtherance
of reaching a settlement.").
161. See CHARLES S. ZIMMERMAN, I PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE LITIGATION § 8:31 (2013)
("The MDL courts for the most part believe tolling agreements are helpful for it takes the pressure off the clerk's
office in the MDL court district and allows meaningful work in the MDL to occur and holds down mass filings
of cases simply to protect the statute of limitation, especially in short statute states like California and Louisiana
where one year statute of limitations exist."); Clarex Ltd. v. Natixis Sec. Am. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7908, 2013 WL
2631043, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) (tolling agreement suspended limitations period for contract claim
by almost 5 years).
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to plaintiffs, defendants, and the court. This kind of explicit waiver suspends statutes of
limitations in general and the securities laws' statutes of limitations specifically. 16 2 Also,
although one cannot forfeit the benefit of a statute of repose, case law does suggest that
one can waive the benefit of repose provisions of the securities laws and repose periods
generally. 163 This case law is discussed more fully in Part V.
IV. SPECIAL TIMELINESS RULES APPLICABLE TO PUTATIVE SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

Timeliness rules that apply to class actions have special relevance for securities
litigators. Securities cases most often proceed as a class action because the class
mechanism provides a means to aggregate a dispersed group of investors into a single suit
and offset otherwise de minimis losses with economies of scale. 164 In fact, the substantive
rules that apply to securities claims facilitate resolving securities cases on a class-wide
basis. 165

To understand the timeliness rules that apply to securities class actions, we must
revisit the central feature of any class action: representation. 166 The federal class action
enables large numbers of diverse people to aggregate similar claims into a single
lawsuit. 16 7 By doing so, the class action device provides persons with injuries too small to
justify the cost of a lawsuit with an economically feasible remedy and spares the courts

162. See Randon v. Toby, 52 U.S. 493, 510-11 (1850) ("An agreement by a debtor to apply a certain portion
of his crops towards the extinguishment of the debt in consideration of further indulgence, will take a case out of
the statute of limitations, and may set up in avoidance of the plea by way of estoppel upon the debtor."); see also
In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig, 339 F. Supp. 2d 804, 859 (S.D. Tex. 2004) ("The ability of parties to enter
agreements to waive the assertion of defenses based on limitations has long been recognized in this circuit.").
163. See ESI Montgomery Cnty., Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(upholding an express waiver of repose period in a federal securities action); McRaith v. BDO Seidman, LLP,
909 N.E.2d 310, 328-29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (upholding 12 tolling agreements that "forfeit" the defendant's
"potential timeliness defenses without exception or condition precedent"); First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Cent.
Bank & Trust Co., 937 P.2d 855, 860 (Colo. App. 1997) (upholding written agreement tolling statute of repose
pending a final adjudication of federal claims); One N. McDowell Assoc. v. McDowell Dev. Co., 389 S.E.2d 834,
836 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding written agreement tolling repose period under North Carolina construction
law).
164. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Class actions are a particularly appropriate
and desirable means to resolve claims based on the securities laws, since the effectiveness of the securities laws
may depend in large measure on the application of the class action device.") (internal quotations omitted); Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[A] class action may well be the appropriate means for
expeditious litigation of the issues, because a large number of individuals may have been injured, although no
one person may have been damaged to a degree which would have induced him to institute litigation solely on
his own behalf.").
165. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 PRIVATE SECURITIES-FRAUD
LITIGATION § 1.1, at 3-4 (2014) (explaining that securities claims are often litigated as class actions in federal
court because the Supreme Court's securities jurisprudence facilitates class-wide resolution of securities claims).
166. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) ("The class action is an exception to
the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.... [T]o justify a
departure from that rule, a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer
the same injury as the class members.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) ("A federal class action is ... truly [a] representative suit.").
167. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) ("The class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to
proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that
their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable.").
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from having to shepherd hundreds of substantially similar cases. 168 But a class, which can
consist of hundreds, maybe thousands, of persons across the country, cannot hope to direct
a case in the same way that a single plaintiff can. 169 Instead, the class action mechanism
dictates that one person (or group) should represent and protect the interests of the whole
class. 170 Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the named representative must adequately
represent the class and have claims that are typical of the group.171
The desire that an adequate representative lead the class is elevated under the
securities laws. 172 Congress perceived that securities litigation was too lawyer-driven and
that lead plaintiffs were often figureheads who did too little to monitor or control plaintiffs'
counsel. 173 To remedy that, the securities laws require that a securities class action be led
by, not just any adequate representative, but by the "most capable" representative-defined
as the representative who meets Rule 23's requirements and has the greatest financial
interest in the case. 174 Congress devised special rules to govern the lead plaintiff s selection
in a securities class action to ensure the plaintiff with the largest losses (typically an
institutional investor) and thus, presumably, the plaintiff who is the most motivated to
manage the case and direct counsel, would lead the group. 175 That is, the securities laws
168. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (suggesting that a class action is appropriate
when "the amounts at stake for individuals [are] so small that separate suits [are] impracticable"); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (lamenting the flood of asbestos-related lawsuits that began in the
1970s).
169. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 223 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Most of the safeguards we
have described vanish in the class action context, where 'the client' is a sizeable, often far-flung, group. Logistical
and coordination problems invariably preclude class members from meeting and agreeing on anything, and, at all
events, most class members generally lack the economic incentive or sophistication to take an active role. There
is simply no way for 'the class' to select, retain, or monitor counsel.").
170. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (allowing for one or more members of a class to sue as representative
parties on behalf of all members when certain conditions are met).
171. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(3)-(4) (requiring that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and ... the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class").
172. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,320-21 (2007) (recognizing that a central
aim of Congress's PSLRA was to encourage efficient resolution of claims in class action proceedings overseen
by a single, institutional investor plaintiff and litigated by a single law firm); Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp.,
257 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Any lingering uncertainty, with respect to the adequacy standard in securities
fraud class actions, has been conclusively resolved by the PSLRA's requirement that securities class actions be
managed by active, able class representatives who are informed and can demonstrate they are directing the
litigation. In this way, the PSLRA raises the standard adequacy threshold.").
173. Cf 7B CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1806 (3d ed. 2005)
("Several factors support the conclusion that the scope of the [Securities Litigation Uniform Standards] Act's
phrase 'misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security,' 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A), does not extend further than misrepresentations that are material to the
decision by one or more individuals .. .to purchase or sell a covered security.").
174. Under the PSLRA, a court "shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported
plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2002) ("While the words
'most capable' seem to suggest that the district court will engage in a wide-ranging comparison to determine
which plaintiff is best suited to represent the class, the statute defines the term much more narrowly: The 'most
capable' plaintiff-and hence the lead plaintiff-is the one who has the greatest financial stake in the outcome of the
case, so long as he meets the requirements of Rule 23.").
175. Courts are to "adopt a [rebuttable] presumption" that the most adequate plaintiff is the plaintiff who: (1)
has either filed a complaint or moved to be named lead plaintiff; (2) has the largest financial interest in the relief
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actively "funnel as many claims as possible arising out of a given fraud into a single action
managed by a single institutional investor plaintiff and litigated by a single law firm." 176
Thus, securities class actions and class actions generally depend on the legal fiction
that unnamed class members are, in fact, parties to the action represented by an adequate
proxy. 177 The Federal Rules allow-indeed encourage-class members to rely on the lead
plaintiff to press their claims. 17 8 The Federal Rules provide absent class members three
different ways they can be involved in the class litigation. First, class members can be
passive by allowing the class to represent their rights and agreeing to be bound by the
judgment. 179 Second, class members can be active by opting out of the class action and
bringing their own suit. 180 Or third, class members may wait to see how the class action
unfolds and later intervene if the district court denies class certification. 181 To encourage
absent plaintiffs to expediently evaluate and exercise one of these three options, the Federal
Rules urge the district judge to decide whether an action should proceed as a class action
at an early practicable time. 182
Like all other lawsuits, class actions are subject to timeliness bars. Their
representative nature, however, presents a unique timeliness issue. The problem is that the
class action mechanism would not reduce repetitious and unnecessary filings if each

sought by the class; and (3) satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)-(II). As explained by the court in In re Cendant Corp. Litig., "The goal of this scheme is to
'increase the likelihood that parties with significant holdings in issuers, whose interests are more strongly aligned
with the class of shareholders, will participate in the litigation and exercise control over the selection and actions
of plaintiffs counsel.' . . . Its underlying assumption is that the plaintiff or plaintiff group with the strongest
financial interest will pursue the claims with the greatest vigor and will have both the interest and the clout to
engage qualified counsel at the best rates for the class. The court is then charged with ensuring that the reality of
the case accords with these assumptions." In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 145-46 (D.N.J. 1998).
176. Second Circuit Holds that American Pipe Class Action Tolling Doctrine Does Not Apply to Statute of
Repose in SecuritiesAct of 1933, 127 HARv. L. REv. 1501, 1508 (2014).
177. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 223 n.3 (reasoning that, in the context of a securities
class action, only one entity is entitled to speak for the class, the lead plaintiff); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79
F.R.D. 283, 291 (C.D. Cal. 1978) ("The fiction of vicarious presence may be justified in plaintiff class actions . .
. where many if not all absent members of a plaintiff class would never enjoy a day in court but for the class
action, and while technically lacking a day in court they are compensated by free, effective representation and the
possibility of a windfall recovery in a suit they might never have brought.") (internal citations and quotations
omitted); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
filing of a class action, in a classic legal fiction, causes the courts to treat members of the asserted class as if they
hav[e] instituted their own actions, at least so long as they continue to be members of the class . .. and they have
the benefit of tolling ... for as long as the class action purports to assert their claims.") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
178. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) (stating that Rule 23 "both
permits and encourages class members to rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims").
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), (d)(1)(B)(iii).
180. Id.
18 1. Id.
182. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (requiring the class certification order "at an early practicable time").
Originally, Rule 23 provided that the district judge should make a class-certification decision "when practicable."
Then, in 1966, Rule 23 was amended to provide that the court should rule on class certification "as soon as
practicable after commencement of an action." Rule 23 was amended in 2003 to alter this language, the new
language, "at an early practicable time." Under the earlier versions and under the current version, the certification
decision should be made promptly. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. Civ. §
1785.3 (3d ed. 2014).
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member of the putative class has to file an individual suit or protective motion just to
prevent claims from expiring in the event that the district court denies class certification.
In American Pipe & ConstructionCo. v. Utah, the Supreme Court addressed this issue and
held that for limitations purposes, once a class suit is filed, that suit is effectively
commenced for all members of the class, thus arresting limitations periods until that action
is definitively not a class action. 183 American Pipe has been consistently justified and
extended as not only a necessary corollary of the class action's representative nature (i.e.,
Rule 23) but also consistent with the limitations periods' purposes.
A. American Pipe's Common-Law Rule for Putative Class Members
Generally, a limitations period stops once the plaintiff files the complaint. 184
Commencing an action stops limitations periods from running for the parties and those in
privity with them, but it does not affect the rights of others. 185 In American Pipe, the Court
explained that the class action's representative nature necessarily has implications for when
a suit is "commenced" for putative class members. American Pipe said that once a plaintiff
commences a class action, an action is commenced on behalf of all putative class members
for purposes of limitations periods.18 6 The Court framed this rule as "tolling" and
"suspending" limitations periods for putative class members who move to intervene after
the district judge has denied class certification.18 7 But the Court also explained that its rule
was one of commencement. For the purposes of timeliness rules, class members filed suit
simultaneously with the filing plaintiff (they "stood as parties to the suit") until the case
was conclusively not a class action ("until and unless they received notice thereof and
chose not to continue"). 188
183. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550-52 (1974). State courts likewise adopted American
Pipe to govern state-law class actions. See White v. Sims, 470 So.2d 1191, 1193 (Ala. 1985); Ling v. Webb, 834
N.E.2d 1137, 1141-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 905 A.2d 340, 355 (Md. Ct.
App. 2006); Grant v. Austin Bridge Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Am. Tierra Corp. v.
City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 762 (Utah 1992).
184. See, e.g., Romualdo P. Eclavea et al., 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions §§ 221, 228 (2014)
(describing general rules for commencement of proceedings).
185. See, e.g., id. § 224 (describing generally, persons affected by commencement).
186. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 550-51 ("A federal class action is no longer 'an invitation to
joinder' but a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious
papers and motions. Under the circumstances of this case, where the District Court found that the named plaintiffs
asserted claims that were 'typical of the claims or defenses of the class' and would 'fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class,' Rule 23(a)(3), (4), the claimed members of the class stood as parties to the suit until
and unless they received notice thereof and chose not to continue."). In American Pipe, Utah--on behalf of other
Utah public bodies and state agencies-sued members of the steel and concrete pipe industries for conspiring to
rig prices for steel and concrete conduit piping in violation of the federal antitrust laws. Id at 541. The district
court denied class certification because, in the judge's view, joining the remaining government entities would not
have been impracticable and thus, there was no need for the class action mechanism. Id. at 538. The district judge
concluded that, based on the number of potential class members, joinder would be practicable. Id. He based this
conclusion on his prior experience with similar antitrust litigation against the same defendants yielded some
attrition among the litigants. Id. at 554 n.23. Afterward, more than 60 Utah towns, municipalities, and water
districts moved to intervene as plaintiffs in the suit. The district judge, however, refused to allow them to do so,
concluding that the motions were untimely. Am, Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 544. The Supreme Court
disagreed. Id. at 538.
187. Id. at 553.
188. Id.at551.
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The Court explained its rule was consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and limitations periods. First, the Court said that a contrary rule would "deprive Rule 23
class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is the principal purpose of
the procedure."' 89 If putative class members could not rely on the class action to comply
with the limitations period, then, the Court said, class members "would be induced to file"
placeholder actions or "protective motions" to intervene-"precisely the multiplicity of
activity which Rule 23 was designed to avoid in those cases where a class action is found
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 1 90 Second, the Court explained that its rule was consistent with the purposes
of limitations periods because once the class claim is filed there is neither the risk of stale
evidence nor litigation uncertainty. The Court said that the defendant has notice "not only
of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic
identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment." 19 1
The defendants in American Pipe claimed that "tolling" for putative class members
extended the limitations period beyond that provided for by Congress and thus the Court
was promulgating a rule of procedure that abridged, enlarged, or modified the substantive
right to repose in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. 192 The Court explained that the
"proper test [under the Rules Enabling Act] is not whether a time limitation is 'substantive'
or 'procedural,' but whether tolling the [limitations period] in a given context is consonant
with the legislative scheme." 193 The Court applied its test, and said its rule still fulfilled
the "policies of repose and certainty inherent in the limitation provisions." 194
American Pipe settled that class members who intervene stand as parties to the initial
complaint and may rely on it for purposes of the limitations periods. Recall, however, that
under the Federal Rules, absent class members who do not let the class representative
represent their rights have other options. For example, they may opt out of the action
altogether, either before or after the class-certification decision. 19 5 The Supreme Court and
the federal courts extended American Pipe's holding to class members who opt out after
and before the class decision. In each instance, the federal courts repeated that the rule set
forth in American Pipe is consistent with Rule 23 and the purposes of limitations periods.
189. Id. at 553.
190. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 551,553.
191. Id. at 554-55.
192. Id. at 556-57 & n.26. The Rules Enabling Act in effect at the time of American Pipe and the current
version provide that "[tihe Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before
magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals," but that these rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072; see also Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934).
193. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 557-58.
194. Id. at 558. The Court also relied on Herb v. Pitcairn,325 U.S. 77 (1945), to support the notion that the
judiciary interprets rules of commencement for limitations periods. In Herb, a railroad employee sued under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, but brought suit within its three-year limitations period in state court, not federal
court. Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77, 78 (1945). Nevertheless, the Court held that the commencement of the state
suit fulfilled the policies of repose and certainty inherent in the FELA's limitations provision. Id. at 79 ("[WJhen
process has been adequate to bring in the parties and to start the case on a course of judicial handling which may
lead to final judgment without issuance of new initial process, it is enough to commence the action within the
federal statute.").
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), (d)(1)(B)(iii).
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Opt-Outs After Class Certification

First, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,the Court extended American Pipebeyond

those who intervene to those who opt out and file their own suits after the district judge
denies class certification. 196 The Court was unequivocal: For the purposes of limitations
periods, the Court would consider unnamed plaintiffs to have sued when the first plaintiff
filed the class action complaint, regardless whether class members move to intervene or
later opt out of the class and bring their own suit. 197 The rule, the Court said, was consistent
with Rule 23 and the purposes of limitations provisions. 198 First, there was no reason to
treat opt outs any different from intervenors because without American Pipe the "same
inefficiencies" would ensue and putative class members who feared "that class certification
may be denied would have every incentive to file a separate action prior to the expiration
of his own period of limitations." 1 99 Second, the Court reiterated that applying American
Pipe to opt-outs was consistent with the purposes of limitations periods. Once the lead
plaintiff filed a class action complaint, that complaint notified the defendant of, not only
the claims, but also the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may
participate in the suit, thereby causing the parties to preserve evidence and eliminating any
litigation uncertainty. 200 Indeed, once the first plaintiff files a class complaint, the
defendant must find its witnesses, revive memories, and gather evidence to defend the class
suit, and so, a separate opt-out suit using the same witnesses and same evidence does not
implicate the problems of stale evidence or upset settled expectations.
2.

Opt-Outs Before Class Certification

Second, recent federal decisions have extended American Pipe even further to cover
class members who opt out and file individual actions before the district judge rules on

196. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983). In Crown, two former employees sued their
employer for race discrimination. Id. at 347. They purported to represent all African Americans who were or
continued to be denied equal job opportunities by the defendant because of their race. Id.The district judge refused
to certify the class. Id. Then, an employee filed an individual suit in federal court, but the district judge concluded
that that suit was filed too late. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court concluded that the suit was timely. Crown, Cork
& Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354. After American Pipe, some courts read American Pipe narrowly, suspending
limitations periods only when class members actually intervened. Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 618, 620 (9th
Cir. 1982); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977).
197. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 350 ("While American Pipe concerned only intervenors, we conclude
that the holding of that case is not to be read so narrowly. The filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations
as to all asserted members of the class, not just as to intervenors.").
198. Id. at 351. The Court also observed that failure to apply American Pipe to class members filing separate
actions would have been inconsistent with Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Id at 345-46. A
few months after American Pipe, the Supreme Court confirmed that American Pipe was meant to have real teeth
and suggested that American Pipe tolling applies to putative class members who opt out after the district court
grants class certification. In Eisen the Court held that individual notice must be sent and paid for by plaintiffs to
all class members who can be identified with reasonable efforts. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173. In the course of its
decision, the Court addressed the argument that class members, even if individually notified of the class's
certification, would not opt out because the limitations period had long since run on the class members' claims.
Id The Court said that this contention "is disposed of by [American Pipe],which established that commencement
of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class." Id. at 176 n.13.
199. Crown, Cork, & Seal, 462 U.S. at 350-51.
200. Id. at 352.
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class certification. 20 1 These cases extend American Pipe to this situation because
"members of the asserted class are treated for limitations purposes as having instituted their
own actions, at least so long as they continue to be members of the class," and thus "the
limitations period does not run against them during that time." 20 2 And these courts invoke
the same two principles consistently applied by the Supreme Court. First, suspending the
limitations period by former class members who opt out before class certification is
consistent with Rule 23: "The American Pipe tolling doctrine was created to protect class
members from beingforced to file individual suits in order to preserve their claims. It was
not meant to induce class members to forgo their right to sue individually." 203 Moreover,
when plaintiffs opt out to file their own suit, they are not disavowing that the class action
represented their interests, but they are retaking the reins from the lead plaintiff who
initially filed the class complaint. 204 Second, the rule is consistent with the purposes of
limitations provisions in preventing stale evidence and precluding litigation uncertainty.
These courts reason that defendants receive no less notice when putative class members
file an individual suit before certification. 205
201. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2008); In re
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2008); In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496
F.3d 245, 254-56 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Blanco v. AmVAC Chemical Corp., No. 11 c-07-149, 2012 WL
3194412, at *14 n.12 (Del. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2012) (describing these decisions as "more recent decisions at the
appellate level"). Not all courts agree with this approach. Other courts conclude that when plaintiffs file their own
suit before the district judge rules on certification, the plaintiffs have "forfeit" the chance to rely on American
Pipe. According to these courts, first, filing their own lawsuit is an affirmative choice not to rely on the class
action mechanism, and second, early filing generates more litigation and expense, precisely what American Pipe's
rule is designed to avoid. See Wyser-Pratte M Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2005)
(collecting other cases).
202. In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir. 2007); see also In re Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that limitations period for plaintiffs action
against manufacturer of plutonium was tolled by virtue of American Pipe). Other federal courts have even
extended American Pipe to situations when the class action is voluntarily dismissed. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Atlas
Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The rationale of American Pipe does not
permit a distinction among situations in which the putative class representative gives up before, or after, the judge
decides whether the case may proceed on behalf of a class. Tolling lasts from the day a class claim is asserted
until the day the suit is conclusively not a class action-which may be because the judge rules adversely to the
plaintiff, or because the plaintiff reads the handwriting on the wall and decides not to throw good money after
bad. (Or perhaps because the defendant buys off the original plaintiff as soon as the statute of limitations runs,
hoping to extinguish the class members' claims. That's a good reason for tolling, not a reason for blocking later
suits.)."). Unnamed class members cannot control whether the named plaintiff decides to abandon the suit, and if
the limitations periods are not arrested in cases of voluntary dismissal, then unnamed class members would be
encouraged to file their own lawsuits to ensure that their claims are not deemed untimely in the event that the
named plaintiff does decide to voluntarily dismiss claims. See, e.g., Monroe Cnty. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. YPF
Sociedad Anonima, No. 13 Civ. 842, 2013 WL 5548833, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2013) (similar). Yet, these courts
observe, "the whole point of American Pipe is to allow unnamed class members to rely on the pending class
action in lieu of filing their own protective lawsuits," thereby giving effect to a class action's representative nature.
Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
203. In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 256 (2d Cir. 2007); see also In re Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that "members of the plaintiff-class who have
filed individual suits are entitled to the benefits of American Pipe").
204. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1233 (holding that "each putative
class member has effectively been a party to an action against the defendant").
205. See, e.g., In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d at 255 ("A defendant is no less on notice when putative
class members file individual suits before certification.").
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Tolling under American Pipe does not continue forever, however. Under American
Pipe, limitations periods resume running when the action is definitively no longer a class
action, which can occur when the district court denies class certification or decertifies a
class, 20 6 or when the plaintiff decides, at whatever point, not to pursue his claim as part of
the class and intervenes or files suit individually. 2 07 In sum, American Pipeand its progeny
generally provide that the filing of a class action will toll a limitations period for the lead
plaintiff and putative class members until the suit is no longer a class action. 20 8
B. American Pipe'sQuestionableApplication to Statutes ofRepose
American Pipe has universal application to the statutes of limitations under the
securities laws. No court has questioned this. 209 Whether American Pipe applies to the
repose provisions of the securities laws, however, is uncertain. 2 10 The Supreme Court was
set to resolve this uncertainty in Police Retirement Systems v. IndyMac, but revoked its
206. These events serve as notice to the plaintiff that his rights are no longer being represented. Crown, Cork
& Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983); see also Hall v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 727 F.3d 372,
375-76 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Under American Pipe,the statute of limitations for the putative class members resumes
running when class certification is denied or when a certified class is decertified.... Once the district court denies
certification or decertifies a class, the putative class members have no reason to assume that their rights are being
protected.") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Larson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 530 F.3d 578, 582 (7th
Cir. 2008) (stating that American Pipe tolling applies upon the commencement of a class action until it is "certain
that the suit would not proceed" as such).
207. Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2011).
208. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9:56 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining
that American Pipe tolling applies when "five foundational requirements exist," including that (1) someone has
filed a purported class action; (2) the class action compliant includes the plaintiff within its asserted class; (3) the
plaintiff possessed a claim that was timely when the putative class suit was filed; (4) the plaintiff possessed a
claim that the prior class action asserted; and (5) the plaintiff presses that claim against a person or entity whom
the purported class action named as a defendant). American Pipe and its progeny do not allow one to file
successive class action lawsuits. Were the rule otherwise, limitations periods could theoretically be extended
indefinitely. See Basch v. Ground Round, Inc., 139 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that "Plaintiffs may not
stack one class action on top of another and continue to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely"); Griffin v.
Singletary, 17 F.3d 356,359 (1 Ith Cir. 1994); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988); Robbin v. Flour
Corp., 835 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir. 1987); Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (2d Cir. 1987); Salazar-Calderon
v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass'n, 765 F.2d 1334, 13351 (5th Cir. 1985).
209. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that
American Pipe applies to the statute of limitations applicable to Section 11 and Section 12 claims under the 1933
Act); Larson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 530 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97,
101-02 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Smith v. Pennington, 352 F.3d 884, 892-93 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); Plumbers'
Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 894 F. Supp. 2d 144, 154-55 (D. Mass.
2012) (same); Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1486 (D. Minn. 1984) (same). See also Hall v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 727 F.3d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that American Pipe applies to the statute
of limitations applicable to claims under Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934 Act); Employers-Teamsters Local
Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); Becks
v. Emery-Richards, Inc., No. 87-1554, 1990 WL 303548, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 1990) (same).
210. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. MDL 1658, 2012 WL 6840532, at
*3 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2012) (remarking that "the applicability of the American Pipe tolling doctrine on periods of
repose for claims filed through the class action vehicle has remained uncertain"); In re Smith Barney Transfer
Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (observing that courts in the Southern District of New
York are divided over whether the filing of a class action complaint tolls the securities laws' statutes of repose);
Plumbers, Pipefitters & MES Local Union No. 392 Pension Fund v. Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd., 886 F. Supp. 2d
328, 334 (S,D.N.Y. 2012) ("There is no consensus among courts on whether to toll statutes of repose.").
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granting of the writ of certiorari just days after the parties announced a pending
settlement. 2 11
1. FederalCourts Applying American Pipe to the Securities Laws' Repose Provisions

Several federal courts conclude that American Pipe applies to the securities' repose
provisions. These courts conclude that arresting limitations periods under American Pipe
is a common-law rule of procedure applicable to class actions, not just another species of
equitable tolling.2 12 Treating American Pipe as "not really tolling at all" was the approach
taken by the Tenth Circuit in Joseph v. Wiles. 2 13 In that case, the court differentiated
American Pipe from equitable tolling prohibited under Lampf by calling American Pipe
"legal rather than equitable in nature." 214 The court explained that equitable tolling is
appropriate when the plaintiff files a timely but defective pleading or does not file a timely
pleading because the adversary tricked him into letting the deadline pass. 2 15 The rule, as
laid out in American Pipe, in contrast, is not about excusing a late or defective filing, but
treating an earlier-filed complaint as the plaintiffs complaint because he was a member of
that putative class. 2 16 This kind of "tolling," the Tenth Circuit said, was perfectly consistent
with Lampf because Lampf provided that "litigation . . . must be commenced within one
year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after
such violation." 217
The Tenth Circuit also explained that American Pipe applies to repose periods just as
it would to statutes of limitations because it was consistent with the policies of Rule 23 and
211. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, High Court Reverses Decision To Hear IndyMac Appeal, LAw360 (Sept. 29,
2014,
3:38
PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/securities/articles/582081?nlpk=a43b563a-bd15-45a2-aedad1a9cb668d75&utmsource=newsletter&utmmedium-email&utm_campaign=securities (access required).
212. See Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying American Pipe to the statute of
repose governing Plaintiff's cause of action); New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Residential Capital, LLC,
288 F.R.D. 290, 293-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152, 15960 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 767
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Genesee Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Trust 2006-3, 825 F. Supp. 2d 1082,
1129 (D.N.M. 2011); Int'l Fund Mgmt. S.A. v. Citigroup Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 368, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re
Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 650, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Plumbers'
& Pipefitters' Local No. 562 Supplemental Plan & Trust v. J.P. Morgan Acceptance Corp. I, No. 08 Civ. 1713,
2011 WL 6182090, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011); Maine State Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 722 F.
Supp. 2d 1157,1166 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Ballard v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., No. MDL 02-MD-1335, 2005 WL 1683598,
at *7 (D.N.H. July 11, 2005); In re Discovery Zone Sec. Litig., 181 F.R.D. 582,600 n. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Salkind
v. Wang, No. Civ. A. 93-10912, 1995 WL 170122, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 1995). Courts have concluded that
American Pipe applies to statutes of repose found outside the securities laws. See Hrdina v. World Say. Bank,
FSB, No. C 11-05173, 2012 WL 294447, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (applying American Pipe to the
statute of repose under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F.
Supp. 2d 164, 176-77 (D. Mass. 2009) (applyingAmerican Pipeto the statute of repose under ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1113(1)).
213. See Joseph v. Wiles, 233 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[In a sense, application of the American
Pipe tolling doctrine to cases such as this one does not involve 'tolling' at all. Rather, Mr. Joseph has effectively
been a party to an action against these defendants since a class action covering him was requested but never
denied.").
214. Id. at 1166-67.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1167.
217. Id. at 1166-67.
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the point of repose periods. 218 First, with respect to Rule 23, the Tenth Circuit observed
that Rule 23 encourages judicial economy by eliminating the need for potential class
members to file individual claims, and if all class members were required to file claims to
avoid timeliness bars, the point of Rule 23 would be defeated. 2 19 Courts following this
approach warned that investors may file protective motions and lawsuits to secure their
claims because "[o]ffending conduct often comes to light years after the fact" and "class
certification can be a lengthy process, and there is always a risk that certification would be
denied." 220 Just as with the statute of limitations, without tolling for the repose provisions,
"putative class members have significant incentives to file placeholder actions and
protective motions." 22 1
Second, the Tenth Circuit stated that tolling the limitations period while class
certification is pending does not undermine the purposes of statutes of repose but is
consistent with them. The securities laws' statutes of repose protect defendants from the
unfair surprise of stale claims and provide defendants with peace of mind knowing that
earlier actions will no longer be the subject of a suit. These ends are met, the court said,
when a class action is commenced. 222 Once a class action is filed, the defendants are on
notice of the substantive claim as well as the identities of potential plaintiffs. 223
2. FederalCourts Refusing to Apply American Pipe to the Securities Laws' Statutes of
Repose
Decisions that do not apply American Pipe to statutes of repose do so because they
consider American Pipe an equitable rule. 2 24 American Pipe is premised on equitable
considerations of fairness (i.e., the defendant does not suffer unfair surprise because the
class complaint provides adequate notice) and judicial economy (i.e., the rule spares the
system from multiple placeholder suits). 225 But Lampfprohibits applying equitable tolling
to the securities laws' statutes of repose, and therefore, these courts conclude, American
Pipe does not apply to the securities laws' statutes of repose.
There is reason to question whether American Pipe is the equitable species of tolling
or really tolling at all. Equitable tolling excuses a late filing because some extraordinary
circumstance prevented the plaintiff from complying with the deadline. In that situation,
the policies of limitations periods (stale evidence and litigation uncertainty) are outweighed
218. Joseph, 233 F.2d at 1167.
219. Id.
220. In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
221. See, e.g., In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(quoting In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 650, 668 (S.D.N.Y.
2011)). The Tenth Circuit also explained that the notice and opt-out provision of Rule 23 would be irrelevant
without tolling because the limitations period for absent class members would most likely expire, making the
right to pursue individual claims meaningless. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1167.
222. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1167.
223. Id at1168.
224. See, e.g., John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.) v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 938 F. Supp. 2d 440, 44546 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing American Pipe as equitable tolling); In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig.,
800 F. Supp. 2d 477,482 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing American Pipe as equitable tolling); Footbridge Ltd. Trust
v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing American Pipeas equitable
tolling).
225. FootbridgeLtd., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
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by the injustice the plaintiff has suffered because the plaintiff missed the deadline, not for
lack of diligence, but because of some other factor outside of the plaintiffs control.
American Pipe, however, does not address whether a court may excuse a plaintiff from
filing a late complaint because of some impediment to timely compliance. Rather,
American Pipe addresses the circumstance where a plaintiff relied on a timely, earlier-filed
complaint as his very own. American Pipe says that this complaint is, for limitations
purposes, the start of a proceeding for all putative class members.
Other decisions do not apply American Pipe to the securities laws' statutes of repose
for a different reason. In Police & FireRetirement System of the City ofDetroitv. IndyMac
MBS, Inc., the Second Circuit refused to apply American Pipe to the securities laws' statute
of repose, not because American Pipe was equitable, but because repose for defendants
should be unyielding and absolute. 226 The Second Circuit stressed that regardless whether
American Pipewas equitable, legal, or some other kind of tolling, a court could not extend
the limitations period beyond the time allowed under the statute of repose under any
circumstances. That approach has support from the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncements on the differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.
In CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,227 the Supreme Court explained that statutes of repose
establish the "outer limit on the right to bring a civil action," a "cutoff' of liability similar
to the discharge in bankruptcy. In CTS, the Court stressed that repose periods were
unrelated to the accrual of any cause of action, but instead ran from the date of the last
culpable act or omission, barring a plaintiffs claim regardless whether the plaintiff
discovered the injury or an injury even occurred. 2 28
Additionally, in IndyMac, the Second Circuit held that the Rules Enabling Act
prohibited tolling the securities laws' statutes of repose under American Pipe. That Act
prohibits rules of procedure from modifying substantive rights. 229 The Second Circuit said
that the repose provisions create a substantive right to be free from liability after a period,
and allowing a plaintiff to intervene or file a suit after this period modifies that substantive
right. 23 0 Problematic for this argument, however, is the portion of American Pipe where
the Court considered-and rejected-the argument that tolling was inconsistent with the
Rules Enabling Act. The Second Circuit said that portion of American Pipe did not apply
226. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of the City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir. 2013)
("But we need not try to divine any hidden meanings in American Pipe. If its tolling rule is properly classified as
"equitable," then application of the rule to Section 13's three-year repose period is barred by Lampf which states
that equitable "tolling principles do not apply to that period."). In later decisions, the Second Circuit affirmed its
position. See Friedus v. ING Groep, N.V., 543 F. App'x. 92, 93 (2d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential decision) (stating
that tolling is unavailable under the statute of repose); Caldwell v. Berlind, 543 F. App'x. 37, 39. (2d Cir. 2013)
(nonprecedential decision) (same). District courts in the Second Circuit have extended the IndyMac holding and
treated statutes of repose as always inviolable unless specifically modified by statute. See, e.g., In re Bear Steams
Co., Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 995 F. Supp. 2d 291, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that American Pipe
does not apply to the 5-year statute of repose applicable to claims under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5); In re
Longtop Fin. Techs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 939 F. Supp. 2d 360, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15 may not be construed to permit a claim to relate back beyond the five-year statute of repose
applicable to Section 10(b) claims).
227. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175,2182-83 (2014).
228. Id. at 2182.
229. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 109.
230. Id.; see also Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360, 366-67 (Ariz. 2011) (concluding that
American Pipe did not apply to Arizona's statutes of repose).
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because American Pipe addressed the statute of limitations, not the statute of repose, which,
as many courts have said, is substantive, not procedural. 23 1 On the other hand, American
Pipe said the "proper test [under the Rules Enabling Act] is not whether a time limitation
is 'substantive' or 'procedural,' but whether tolling the limitation in a given context is
consonant with the legislative scheme." 2 32 The Court did not suggest any different
treatment for a statute of repose. When the Court applied its test, it said broadly that the
judicial power to toll statutes of limitations was "not breaking new ground," but fulfilling
the "policies of repose and certainty inherent in the limitation provisions." 233Additionally,
some scholars have proposed that what the Court was really doing in American Pipe was
announcing a federal common-law rule, not interpreting Rule 23 at all. 234 That is, Rule 23
was not "the source of the limitations-tolling rule" announced by the Court, but rather, the
case provided the Court with the "occasion ... to implement class action policies in federal
common law that it was otherwise authorized to make." 235 As argued by Professors
Stephen Burbank and Tobias Wolff, "[m]any, if not most, of the Federal Rules are charters
for discretionary decisionmaking, setting boundaries and leaving the actual choices to
federal trial judges" to develop through the federal common law. 2 36 The Rules Enabling
Act does not interfere with the Court's ability to develop the federal common law. The
Rule Enabling Act ensures that if Congress has had a chance to review and make a policy
choice, then the Court must respect that choice. 237 In American Pipe, however, the Court
was not overriding any choice by Congress. 238
C. American Pipe's Relevance to Securities Litigation
American Pipe has special relevance to securities litigation for three reasons. First,
the securities laws facilitate the resolution of securities laws on a class-wide basis, but the
securities laws' rules of procedure also build in delay from the filing of the complaint until
the appointment of a lead plaintiff.2 39 Second, institutional investors, usually those with
240
the most money lost, claim to rely on American Pipe while evaluating their claims.
Third, some worry that without American Pipe, litigants would glut the courts with
securities placeholder actions and protective motions, increasing costs for plaintiffs,
defendants, and the judicial system. 24 1

231. IndyMacMBS, Inc., 721 F.3dat 109 n.17.
232. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557-58 (1974).
233. Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
234. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady
Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 17,49-50 (2010) (telling how the courts have confused federal procedure and common
law); Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on PaulCarrington's 'Substance'and'Procedure'inthe
Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1027-29 (1989) (similar).
235. Burbank & Wolff, supranote 234, at 50.
236. Id. at 48.
237. Id at 48-49.
238. Burbank, supra note 234, at 1027-28.
239. See KAUFMAN & WUNDERLICH, supra note 165, § 1.1, at 3-4, and infra Part 111.C. 1.
240. See infra Part III.C.2.
241. See infra Part fll.C.3. Even the courts that refuse to apply American Pipe to statutes of repose recognize
the strong policy aims in favor of the rule. See, e.g., Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 618, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ('True, many of the policy considerations present in American Pipe would
support tolling of a statute of repose."); Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360, 366-67 (Ariz. 2011)
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1. The Securities Laws Build in Delay Before Class Certification
The procedural rules governing securities suits build in delay from the filing of the
complaint until the appointment of the lead plaintiff. The rules do so in two ways. First,
the PSLRA "contemplates a window of almost four months between filing of the first class
complaints and appointment of a lead plaintiff."242 Under the PSLRA, a plaintiff who files
a securities class-action compliant must publish notice to other potential class members
within 20 days to encourage them to step forward. 2 43 Then, putative class members may
move the district judge to consider them as lead plaintiffs for 60 days after publication of
the notice. 244 This period "affords investors an opportunity to assess the case and decide
whether they wish to play a leadership role in the litigation." 24 5 The court must then
appoint a lead plaintiff within 90 days of the publication. 246
Second, the securities laws effectively put a class action on ice until the defendants'
motion to dismiss is resolved, which can take over a year. 247 In virtually every securities
class action, defendants move to dismiss. 24 8 Under the PSLRA, discovery "and other
proceedings" are stayed pending any motion to dismiss. 249 According to some case law,
under the PSLRA, it is inappropriate to rule on class certification (one of these "other
proceedings") once the stay kicks in and a motion to dismiss is pending. 250 This may also
("We agree that 'many of the policy considerations present in American Pipe would support tolling a statute of
repose."').
242. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 193 n.Il (3d Cir. 2005); see also The Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. REP. No. 107-146, at 9 (2002) ("A lead plaintiff must be selected
by the court, a process that can take months.").
243. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A); see also Burke v. Ruttenberg, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1310 (N.D. Ala. 2000)
("The obvious and primary goal with which subsection 21D(a)(3)(A)(i) was drafted was that of encouraging the
most adequate plaintiff to step forward and control the litigation.").
244. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II).
245. KAUFMAN & WUNDERLICH, supra note 165, § 7:2 at 302.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
247. The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. REP. No. 107-146, at 9 (2002)
("Discovery is automatically stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, consideration of which can
take over a year in itself. During that period the stop watch continues to run on the claim, even though the victim
has little or no ability to find out more about exactly who participated in the fraudulent activity and how the fraud
was accomplished. With the higher pleading standards that also govern securities fraud victims, it is unfair to
expect victims to be able to negotiate such obstacles in the span of 12 months.").
248. For standard securities-fraud claims (which include those brought under Section 11 and Section 12 of
the 1933 Act, and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act), filed and resolved between January 2000 and December 2012,
defendants moved to dismiss in more than 96% of cases, and almost all cases without a motion to dismiss ended
with settlement. Renzo Comolli et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2012 Full-Year
Review: Settlements Up; Attorneys'FeesDown, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 16 (Jan. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_2013_YearEnd Trends.pdf.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3). The PSLRA explicitly provides that during the stay,
a party with actual notice of the allegations must treat all discoverable evidence within that party's control as if it
were subject to a continuing request for production of documents under the Federal Rules. The PSLRA does
provide limited exceptions to the stay if the court finds that particularized discovery is necessary to either: (1)
"preserve evidence"; or (2) "prevent undue prejudice to that party." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
250. See In re Nat'l Austrl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537, 2006 WL 3844463, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,
2006) (collecting cases and stating that "[p]laintiffs were not in a position to move for class certification because
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in lieu of filing an answer, and because discovery was stayed.");
Abrams v. Van Kampen Funds, Inc., No. 01 C 7538, 2002 WL 1989401, at *1 n.l (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2002)
("Although a motion for class certification should generally be ruled upon prior to ruling on a motion to dismiss
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mean that plaintiffs cannot even engage in discovery to challenge the lead plaintiffs
adequacy until later either. 25 1
2. InstitutionalInvestors Rely on American Pipe
American Pipe also has special significance to institutional investors (e.g., university
endowments, public and union pension funds, mutual funds, etc.). Institutional investors
are most likely to have losses large enough to justify an individual suit. 252 For class actions
seeking money damages under the Federal Rules, as securities class actions usually do, the
Federal Rules and the Constitution demand that class members receive the right to opt out
of the class and pursue their own claims if they wish. 253 Empirical study suggests that the
rate at which investors opt out of securities class actions has increased after the 1995
PSLRA, 254 and the more money at stake, the greater the likelihood that an individual
investor will opt-out and proceed with its own case. 2 55 An opt-out suit may be more
attractive than remaining a member of a class for several reasons. First, opting out may
25 6
present a chance to recover more money than if the institution remained in the class.
Second, a single plaintiff has more flexibility in the legal claims that that plaintiff may
assert. And third, a single plaintiff likely has more control over litigation strategy and

some case law supports that, under the PSLRA, it is appropriate to rule on a motion to dismiss prior to considering
class certification."); Winn v. Symons Int'l. Grp., Inc., No. IP 00-0310-C-B/s, 2001 WL 278113, at *2 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 21, 2001) (stating that the PSLRA's discovery stay applies to discovery and other proceedings with some
exceptions, but that "[c]ourts generally do not regard class certification proceedings as one of the exceptions");
In re ValuJet, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1481-82 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (observing that plaintiffs' motion for class
certification was stayed pending resolution of the defendants' motion to dismiss); but see In re Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C 96-2644, 1997 WL 773733, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997) (holding
that "other proceedings" does not include class certification, but applies to "other proceedings which relate to
discovery matters.").
251. Case law has not definitively resolved this issue. The PSLRA explicitly allows for discovery into
whether the lead plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the class, but only if the plaintiff "first
demonstrates a reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of
adequately representing the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv); see also In re KIT Digital, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
293 F.R.D. 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Moreover, this discovery is designed to rebut the presumptive lead plaintiff,
and thus, presumably occurs after the district court makes an initial determination about the presumptive lead
plaintiff. See, e.g., In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing discovery into the presumptive
lead plaintiff's adequacy as the third stage that happens after the district court makes its initial determination).
252. See Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintifs,supra note 13, at 1132 (observing that large institutional investors
are most likely to opt out of securities class actions and file individual suits); Rozen et al., Opt-Out Cases in
Securities Class Action Settlements, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 1 (2013), availableat http://www.cornerstone.
actioncom/getattachment/7cf8bd53-9eOb-45be-b4b3-3d81 0dfe2be3/Opt-Out-Cases-in-Securities-Class
Settlemen.aspx ("The most frequently observed opt-out plaintiffs are pension funds, followed by other types of
asset management companies.").
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
254. Rozen et al., supra note 252, at 2; see also Kevin LaCroix, Opt-Outs: A Worrisome Trend in Securities
Class Action Litigation, 2 OAKBRIDGE INSIGHTS I (Apr. 2007) (providing anecdotal support for the idea "many
more investors, representing significant investment interests, are concluding that it is in their financial interest to
opt-out of the class settlement, often at the urging of prominent plaintiffs' securities firms").
255. Rozen et al., supra note 252, at 3.
256. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why 'Exit' Works
Better Than 'Voice,'30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 417 (2008) ("When institutional investors exit the class and sue
individually, they appear to do dramatically better- by an order of magnitude!").
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settlement decisions. 2 57 Historically, because of the rule set down in American Pipe, once
a plaintiff filed a class-action complaint and until class certification, these institutional
investors could "sit back and allow the litigation to run its course," 258 without fear of letting
their time to sue pass by. 259
3. A World Without American Pipe
What does the world look like if American Pipe does not apply to statutes of repose?
Those who support applying American Pipe to statutes of repose worry that if that decision
does not apply to statutes of repose, then litigants may inundate courts with placeholder
actions and protective motions. For instance, amici supporting American Pipe's application
to statutes of repose conducted an empirical analysis of securities filings and concluded
that without American Pipe, the potential number of plaintiffs who would need to file a
placeholder suit or protective motion would be substantial. 2 60 That study estimated that the
potential number of plaintiffs who would need to take protective action by counting the
number of cases in which the court's certification order came after the repose periods
expired. 26 1 For claims under the 1933 Act, the study found that for cases between 2002
and 2009, the three-year repose period would have expired in about 83% of the cases. 262
257. Id. at 429-33. This not to say that opting out has no drawbacks whatsoever. Opt-out litigants may have
to pay a higher percentage of attorneys' fees, expert fees, and other litigation costs. To boot, opt-out plaintiffs
now expose themselves to an increased risk that they will be subject to discovery. KAUFMAN & WUNDERLICH,
supra note 165, § 14:2 at 541.
258. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810 ("Unlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent class action plaintiff is not
required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there
are safeguards provided for his protection.").
259. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 256, at 425 ("For decades, institutions did not opt out. Nor did they serve
as class representatives. Rather, they simply remained passive."). Institutional investors' interest in this issue is
evidenced by the amicus brief several institutional investors filed in the IndyMac petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief of Public Funds as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2013 WL 6843346.
260. Brief of Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 7-9, Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640),
2013 WL 8114524, at *7-9 [hereinafter Brief of Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors]. The filing of
placeholder cases may not be reviewed favorably by the courts if the filing is considered simply a means to extend
the limitations periods and the proposed plaintiff has no real legal claim. In Levine v. Atricure, Inc., 508 F. Supp.
2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), the plaintiff moved for appointment as lead plaintiff but the defendant opposed, arguing
that the lead plaintiff was nothing more than a placeholder, chosen not because of his injuries, but to avoid the
expiration of the statute of limitations and provide counsel with more time to find a viable plaintiff. Although the
court rejected that argument as a reason for denying lead-plaintiff status, it cautioned that "if it is entirely clear
that the named plaintiff's claim was without legal basis" and counsel used that plaintiff merely as a placeholder
to obtain an extension just to comply with the limitations period, then sanctions, including dismissal, may be
appropriate. Id at 277-78. See also Boilermakers Nat'l Annuity Trust Fund v. WaMu Mortg. Pass Through
Certificates, Series ARI, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1258-59 (W.D. Wash. 2010) ("Courts since American Pipe have
found that the statute of limitations does not toll for putative class actions whose named plaintiff lacks standing
to advance claims in the first place."); Palmer v. Stassinos, 236 F.R.D. 460, 465-66 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ("It is
one thing to toll a period of limitations because of the discretionary act of one judge seeking to manage his or her
docket in an efficient manner, but it would be beyond the constitutional power of a federal court to toll a period
of limitations based on a claim that failed because the claimant had no power to bring it.").
261. Brief of Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors, supranote 260, at 7.
262. Id at 8. Similarly, according to NERA Economic Consulting, about 66% of securities class actions reach
a decision on class certification within three years from filing of the original complaint. Comolli & Starykh, supra
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For Section 10(b) claims under the 1934 Act, the study found that for cases for the same
timeframe, the five-year repose period would have expired in 76% of the cases. 263 When
one considers that, on average, there are more than 200 securities class actions a year,264
and each one consists of potentially thousands of class members, the number of placeholder
actions or protective motions could be considerable. 265 And, for large institutional
investors with significant losses, it would be reasonable to expect those plaintiffs to file
protective motions or placeholder actions. 266
Opponents of applying American Pipe to statutes of repose observe that the amici's
data presents only part of the story. Counting the number of cases where the district court
decides class certification a certain time after the class complaint is filed does not provide
insight on class members who wouldn't have timely claims anyway. 267 That is, the data
does not explain the difference between class members whose time ran out because the
district judge took too long and those whose time ran out only because the named plaintiff
or absent class member waited too long to file in the first place. 26 8 Opponents point out
that if you consider as evidence just the length of time it takes a district judge to decide on
class certification, there is less of a concern because, according to NERA Economic
consulting, nearly two thirds of the decisions on class certification are reached within three
years from the original filing date of the complaint and the median time is about two and a
half years. 2 69 Thus, in a world where American Pipe does not apply to statutes of repose,
there is no clear agreement on the number of placeholder suits or protective motions likely
to be filed.
What about cost? No doubt, placeholder actions and protective motions, even few,
have costs associated with them. For instance, the system will have to spend resources
shepherding cases that the parties really have no interest in pushing forward until after the
class action plays out. Investors-most likely large institutional investors-will have to
spend money and resources to monitor class actions and determine whether to file

note 7, at 20.
263. Brief of Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors, supra note 260, at 8.
264. In 2013 alone, there were 234 securities class actions. Comolli & Starykh, supranote 7, at 2.
265. Brief of Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors, supra note 260, at 10 (concluding that the
potential number of placeholder actions or protective motions could "easily number[] in the thousands").
266. David D. Siegel, PracticeCommentary, in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658 ("Optimism has no place on a scene that
the [limitations period] is closing in on. Lawyers should not wait until the eleventh hour to ask whether suit is
inevitable, perhaps excusing earlier inaction on the rosy assumption that there was always the chance of a
settlement."); Michael D. Green, The ParadoxofStatutes ofLimitationsin Toxic SubstancesLitigation,76 CALIF.
L. REV. 965, 984-85 (1988) ("One consequence of a sophisticated bar that represents substantial numbers of
victims in discovery rule jurisdictions is that lawyers run-rather than walk-directly to the courthouse with any
client who manifests the slightest indication of insidious disease. Regardless of whether the client has suffered
any disability or pecuniary loss, the attorney knows the safest course of action is filing a suit as promptly as
possible."); Anne E. Thar, Statute of Limitations Boo-Boos, 86 ILL. B.J. 97, 98 (1998) ('I'll think about it
tomorrow' may have worked for Scarlett, but it's a dangerous philosophy for lawyers.... [linvestigate the facts
and file the complaint as soon as possible rather than as late as possible."); Anne E. Thar, Top 10 Ways Not to
Blow a Statute of Limitations, 84 ILL. B.J. 529, 529 (1996) ("According to an ABA nationwide study, over 20%
of all legal malpractice claims result from missed deadlines.").
267. Brief for Bus. Roundtable as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 30, Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of
Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2014 WL 3704559, at *30.
268. Id.
269. Id. (citing NERA).
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placeholder actions and protective motions. 270 But it is questionable how much of a cost
this would really impose. Administrative costs seem mitigated by efficiencies gained from
electronic filings and efficiencies achieved through the Multidistrict Litigation Act. 27 1 And
for institutional investors, plaintiffs' lawyers often offer large institutional investors free
monitoring services. 272 Moreover, large institutional investors may have to monitor the
litigation regardless of their decision to opt in or out. In fact, many plaintiffs' firms
advertise their free monitoring services as a way for an institutional investor to satisfy
fiduciary obligations, independent of any decision to join the case. 27 3 But there is also cost
to defendants who will have to monitor and respond to these placeholder actions and
protective motions, including handling any removal, consolidation, or centralization. 274
270. See Brief for Public Funds as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Pub. Emps.'
Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2013 WL 6843346, at *3 (stating
that investors must be able to redress corporate wrongdoing through class actions under the Securities Act to both
deter improper conduct and recoup losses).
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Hon. John G. Heybum II, A View from the Panel: Partof the Solution, 82
TUL. L. REv. 2225, 2235 (2008) (explaining that the MDL process is designed to "promote fairness [and]
efficiency," that motion deadlines are "relatively short," oral arguments are quick, and the JPML's decisions are
"brief and to the point").
272. See Motley Rice, Portfolio Monitoring Service, http://www.motleyrice.com/securities-and-consumerfraud/portfolio-monitoring-service (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) ("These are precisely the benefits supplied by our
Portfolio Monitoring Service-at no cost to participating institutional and individual clients."); Robins Arroyo
LLP, Investment MonitoringforShareholders,http://www.robbinsarroyo.com/stock-watch/ (last visited Sept. 27,
2014) ("Stock Watch is [our] investment monitoring service for individual and institutional investors. Through
Stock Watch, we track participants' publicly traded investments, including stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other
securities");
Robbins
Geller
Rudman
& Dowd
LLP,
Portfolio Monitoring Program,
http://www.rgrdlaw.com/services-portfolio-monitoring-program.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) ("The cost-free
service is built around proprietary software that is able to provide essential information to track investment
losses."); Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP, Portfolio Monitoring and Case Evaluation,
http://www.blbglaw.com/client services/portfolio monitoring (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) ("At no cost to our
clients, we review the fund's portfolio losses on a regular basis, investigate potential claims and prepare detailed
reports
of our
findings.");
Hausfeld
LLP,
Hausfeld's
Portfolio Monitoring Service,
http://www.hausfeldllp.com/pages/portfolio-monitoring (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) ("Hausfeld LLP offers a free
portfolio monitoring service to public and private investment funds."); Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP,
Kessler
Topaz's
Portfolio
Monitoring
&
Claims
Administration
Program,
http://ktmc.com/investorsportfolio.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) ("We provide this service at NO cost and
without taking a percentage of what is recovered."); Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, Institutional
Investor Services, http://www.whafh.com/modules/practicearea/index.php?action=view&id=22 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2014) ("The firm provides settlement monitoring and claims monitoring to its institutional clients free
of charge and with no obligation on the part of its clients."). But see Sara Hansard, Attorneys Question PortfolioMonitoringServices, INVESTMENTNEWS (Dec. 4, 2006) (stating that Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo
PC "charges a fee for its service").
273. See Motley Rice, supra note 272 ("It is important that funds have multiple firms monitoring their
portfolios to ensure they are able to ... meet their fiduciary duties."); Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
What Services Do I Receive?, http://www.rgrdlaw.com/services-portfolio-monitoring-services.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2014); Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Why is Monitoring My Portfolio Important?,
http://www.rgrdlaw.com/services-portfolio-monitoring-results.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) ("This report
allows fund fiduciaries to make timely assessments of the funds options"); Berman Devalerio, Best Practice:Hire
More Than One Monitoring Firm, http://www.bermandevalerio.com/newsfeed/100-best-practice-hire-morethan-one-monitoring-firm (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) ("[M]onitoring for investment losses due to fraud and
settlement eligibility is an important aspect of an institutional investor's fiduciary duties.").
274. See, e.g., Bryan Denberg, Paying the Toll to be Class Member: The Impact of the American Pipe
Doctrine on Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 87 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 239, 268 (2013) (stating that "the
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That kind of procedural wrangling doesn't come free. It costs defendants time and
money. 2 75 For class actions, there is an added public-relations incentive to keep plaintiffs
from filing a mass of actions to avoid a series of actions that make the situation look worse
than it actually may be-less is more in that regard. 27 6 But all this cost may be worth it if
it allows defendants to dismiss a claim via the limitations period rather than defend new
claims that are brought by later opt outs.
What then are reasons for why American Pipe should not apply to the securities laws'
statutes of repose? On the one hand, this approach may prevent class members from waiting
on the sidelines to see if the class litigation unfolds favorably. There is value in forcing
class members to decide early whether they will stay part of the class or opt out. An early,
binding decision can lend certainty to the size of the class, which may be significant in
settlement negotiations. Moreover, in CTS Corp., the Supreme Court stressed that the very
purpose of a repose period is to provide the defendant certainty and a fresh start free from
liability. 277 On the other hand, this argument appears to have been confronted and rejected
in American Pipe itself. According to the American Pipe Court, Rule 23 already adequately
mitigates the risk that classes won't be defined until too late in the suit by demanding that
278
federal judges address class certification "at an early practicable time."
Another counter to American Pipe's application to repose provisions is that, in reality,
repose would achieve judicial economy consistent with Rule 23. Proponents of this point
contend that the worry about placeholder actions and protective motions is overstated.
Class members with damages too small to justify investment into the case would never file
a protective action or motion anyway, and those plaintiffs who would file such a pleading
or motion, would likely have filed them regardless of the limitations period provided for in
a statute of repose. But does repose in that setting undermine the class mechanism? The
'very core" of a class mechanism is to provide a remedy for those investors with damages

inefficiency feared by plaintiffs having to file protective suits can be mitigated by procedures already commonly
used to manage class actions. Opt-out actions can be consolidated for pretrial proceedings by the U.S. Judicial
Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, and motions to intervene, at the court's discretion, can be deferred pending class
certification decisions."). Granted, plaintiffs already have significant incentive to consolidate actions themselves
as the PSLRA prohibits a federal judge from appointing a lead plaintiff before resolving any pending motions to
consolidate. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(ii) ("If more than one action on behalf of a class asserting the same
claim or claims arising under this chapter has been filed, and any party has sought to consolidate those actions for
pretrial purposes or for trial, the court shall not make the determination required by clause (i) until after the
decision on the motion to consolidate is rendered."). But the PSLRA does not demand that like cases be
consolidated. See, e.g., In re New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Grp. Sec. Litig., No. 12-cv-5724, 2013 WL 1875102,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013) ("[C]onsolidation is not mandatory under the PSLRA.").
275. Litigation costs for major companies are already substantial. According to one study, independent of
judgments, litigation transaction costs, a portion of which would include paying for attorneys' time to handle
procedural wrangling and paying for the various filing fees, account for about 60% of U.S. tort costs, with only
40% of the cost going to the claimant. Statement, Lawyers for Civil Justice, et al., Litigation Cost Survey of Major
Companies, Conference on Civil Litigation, Duke Law School (May 10-11, 2010), available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%/20Materials/Library/Litigation%/20Cost%/20S
urvey/o2Oof/ 20Major/20Companies.pdf.
276. Cf Richard S. Levick & Scott Sobel, Smile, You're On Television, 25 LEGAL TIMES (June 3, 2002),
available at www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/17863/Business+Strategy+Management+Consultancy/
Smile+Youre+on+Television.
277. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014).
278. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
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too small to justify individual investment in the first place. 279 And with respect to those
most likely to opt out regardless, American Pipe was designed to prevent them from being
forced to file individual suits and protective motions to preserve their claims. 280
In sum, the answer to the question what does the world look like if American Pipe
does not apply to statutes of repose, is we don't really know. On the one hand, there is the
concern that merited claims will be lost. On the other hand, there is the counter that such
concern is overstated, and in fact, there is the worry that defendants will never receive
repose. The federal courts have yet to resolve the tension between these aims.
V. REMEDYING THE UNCERTAIN APPLICATION OF LIMITATIONS PERIODS WITH TOLLING
AGREEMENTS
What, then, can parties do about the uncertain application of timeliness bars to the
securities laws? Tolling agreements lend the needed clarity. These agreements have several
laudable ends. First, the use of tolling agreements is a well-established tactic to postpone
protective motions and placeholder actions while the parties work out a settlement or
resolve claims that are more pressing. 28 1 To that end, tolling agreements counter the
protective-motion and placeholder-action problem. 282 Additionally, tolling agreements
allow the parties to focus on more immediate concerns without sacrificing the plaintiffs'
rights to litigate. 283 That tolling agreements suspend the securities laws' statutes of

279. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The policy at the very core of
the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.") (internal
citation omitted).
280. See, e.g., In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 256 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The American Pipe tolling
doctrine was created to protect class members from beingforcedto file individual suits in order to preserve their
claims. It was not meant to induce class members to forgo their right to sue individually.").
281.

See, e.g., 5D ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS

§ 19:29

(2013) ("A plaintiff and a defendant sometimes contractually agree to extend the period of limitations. Tolling
agreements usually are executed when the statute is about to expire and the parties are negotiating settlement.");
see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. Civ. A. H040087, 2005 WL 3504860, at *7 n.15
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 22. 2005) (quoting letter from plaintiffs' counsel to defendants: "While we believe that the
Sarbanes Oxley legislation extends the statute of limitations to two years from the date of actual knowledge of a
claim, there exists the possibility that a defendant could argue that the statute of limitations expires in mid-October
of this year. Thus in an abundance of caution, absent a tolling agreement signed by Royal Bank of Canada, we
will have to name Royal Bank of Canada as a defendant on or before October 16, 2002.").
282. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 549 F. Supp. 2d 496, 525-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Lilly's agreement
to enter tolling agreements was reported in The IndianapolisStar as a 'legal tactic to stall the filing of potentially
hundreds of new lawsuits' related to Zyprexa.... The article reported that Lilly was facing 125 Zyprexa-related
lawsuits and the tolling agreements 'delay the filing of lawsuits on behalf of more than 1800 potential
claimants."'); LaSala v. E*Trade Sec. LLC, 457 F. Supp. 2d 188, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (observing that to
prevent statute of limitations from expiring, defendants entered into tolling agreements with plaintiffs, but some
did not, and thus plaintiff filed "over a hundred separate actions" against those defendants).
283. See ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing how investors
voluntarily dismissed securities-fraud claims without prejudice under tolling agreements while defendant went
through bankruptcy proceedings); Gamoran v. Neuberger Berman, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 7957, 2012 WL 2148217,
at *3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2012) (involving shareholders who demanded the company bring a derivative action
against executives who entered into a tolling agreement with the company while its board conducted internal
investigation into shareholders' claims).
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limitations appears well settled. 284 Compelling authority suggests that tolling agreements
validly arrest statutes of repose as well statutes of limitations.
Tolling agreements arrest repose provisions for several reasons. First, tolling
agreements may practically prevent parties from asserting the statute of repose. It takes
bravado for a party to enter a tolling agreement promising not to raise any timeliness
defenses and then turn around and argue to a court that the claim is time barred. 2 85
Second, case law holds that tolling agreements are consistent with a repose period.
Although only a few courts have confronted whether a tolling agreement arrests a statute
of repose under the securities laws, these courts are unanimous: A tolling agreement may
arrest statutes of repose under the securities laws. 286 The most robust explanation for this
284. See Oaktree Capital Mgmt. LP v. KPMG, 963 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1085 (D. Nev. 2013) (holding that the
tolling agreement suspended the one-year statute of limitations under Section 18 of the 1934 Act); Dow Coming
Corp. v. BB & T Corp., No. Civ. 09-5637, 2010 WL 4860354, at *13 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010) (recognizing that a
tolling agreement suspended two-year statute of limitations under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act); Lane v. Page,
649 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1303 (D.N.M. 2009) (holding that a tolling agreement suspended the one-year statute of
limitations under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act); AIG Global Sec. Lending Corp. v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 646
F. Supp. 2d 385, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing that the tolling agreement suspended the one-year statute of
limitations then applicable to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act); In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 339 F. Supp. 2d 804,
858-59 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (recognizing that the tolling agreement suspended the one-year statute of limitations
under Section 11 of the 1933 Act); Lindner Dividend Fund, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 880 F. Supp. 49, 55 (D. Mass.
1995) (accepting plaintiffs argument that the tolling agreement suspended the one-year statute of limitations);
Xerox Fin. Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Salomon Bros., Inc., No. 92 C 1767, 1992 WL 151923, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(recognizing that the tolling agreement suspended the one-year statute of limitations under Section 12(a)(2) of the
1933 Act and the one-year statute of limitations then applicable to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act); see also
Photopaint Tech., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the tolling
agreement suspended the one-year statute of limitations under the Federal Arbitration Act); G.M. Harston Constr.
Co. v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 268, 2003 WL 22508172, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003) ("[P]arties can contract
to toll the statute of limitations for federal causes of action."). A tolling agreement entered into after the limitations
period has passed does not revive dead claims. See, e.g., Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 32
F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1994).
285. See In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. 11 Civ. 1281, 2012 WL 6584524, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 18, 2012) ("In reliance on the tolling agreement, Calpers waited until November 2011 to file suit. In a notable
bit of 'chutzpah,' E & Y now argues that-notwithstanding its tolling agreement-the claim is time-barred.").
286. See id. (holding that the tolling agreement arrested the three-year statute of repose applicable to Section
11 claims); ESI Montgomery Cnty., Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that the tolling agreement arrested the three-year statute of repose then applicable to claims under Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act); In re Enron Corp., Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No. MDL 1446,2005 WL 3704688,
at *7 n.42 (SD. Tex. Dec. 5, 2005) (holding that the tolling agreement arrested the three-year statute of repose
then applicable to claims under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5); see also McCool v. Strata Oil
Co., 973 F.2d 1452, 1460-61 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the tolling agreement arrested the five-year statute of
repose applicable to claims under the Illinois securities laws); Comerica Bank v. FGMK, LLC, No. 10 C 1930,
2010 WL 2723177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2010) (same); First Interstate Bank of Denver N.A. v. Cent. Bank &
Trust Co. of Denver, 937 P.2d 855, 860-63 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that the tolling agreement arrested the
three-year statute of repose applicable to claims under the Colorado securities laws); McRaith v. BDO Seidman,
LLP, 909 N.E.2d 310, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that the tolling agreement postponed the statute of repose
for re-filing a voluntarily dismissed lawsuit so long as the agreement uses clear language and "contemplates an
eventual ending that is reasonable based on the facts specific to [the] case"). In other contexts, courts have
enforced tolling agreements to arrest statutes of repose. See One N. McDowell Ass'n of Unit Owners, Inc. v.
McDowell Dev. Co., 389 S.E.2d 834, 836 (N.C. App. Ct. 1990) (estopping property developers from asserting a
statute of repose in defense of unit owners' claim arising from defective air-conditioning system where developers
signed a series of agreements in which they agreed not to raise timeliness defenses); Charlotte Motor Speedway,
Inc. v. Tindall Corp., 672 S.E.2d 691,694 (N.C. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that the speedway owner and contractor's
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conclusion comes from the Colorado Court of Appeals in FirstInterstate Bank of Denver
N.A. v. CentralBank & Trust Co. ofDenver, which addressed whether the parties' tolling

agreement arrested the Colorado Securities Act's statute of repose. 287 The court explained
that whether a statute of repose-which is more rigid than the statute of limitations but less
rigid than a jurisdictional time limit-supersedes a private agreement is a question of public
policy.288 In other words, the court said, the inquiry is "whether the legislative purpose is
thwarted if the statute is not applied in a particular circumstance." 2 89 This sounds similar
to the inquiry American Pipe used to evaluate whether tolling was applicable in light of the
Rules Enabling Act. In American Pipe, the Court said: The "proper test is not whether a
time limitation is 'substantive' or 'procedural,' but whether tolling the limitation in a given
context is consonant with the legislative scheme." 29 0 Under this test, FirstInterstate Bank
concluded that tolling agreements were valid as applied to statutes of repose. To begin, the
court observed that the statutory text did not evidence a clear intent to override parties'
private agreements on the matter. The court pointed out that the legislature could have
precluded the parties' ability to waive the statute of repose in the Act itself, but did not. 29 1
For instance, the statutory text under the securities laws is unlike the statutory text in the
Extender Statute under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.292 The language
in the Extender Statute may supersede a tolling agreement.2 93 The Extender Statuteunlike the securities laws-is explicit: Its limitations periods apply "(n]otwithstanding any
provision in any contract." 294
Additionally, First Interstate Bank explained that a tolling agreement is consistent

tolling agreement arrested repose period while personal injury claims were resolved).
287. FirstInterstateBank ofDenver N.A., 937 P.2d at 860.
288. Id. at 862.
289. Id.
290. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557-58 (1974).
291. FirstInterstateBank ofDenver NA., 937 P.2d at 862; see also Stephan v. Goldinger, 325 F.3d 874, 876
(7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the tolling agreement suspended the two-year limitation under the Commodity
Exchange Act, which provided that suits should be brought "no later than two years after the date the cause of
action arises").
292. The Extender Statute was intended to allow certain government agencies acting as a conservator or
liquidating agent more time to sue. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14).
293. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC, 939 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1134 (D.
Kan.), ajf'don othergrounds by 727 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2013).
294. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b) (14). One may be tempted to rely on 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) to argue that a similar
prohibition applies under the securities laws. That provision forbids waiver of "any provision" of the 1934 Act.
In Shearson/AmericanExpress Inc v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,228 (1987), the Supreme Court clarified that this
provision does not mean that any waiver of any part of the securities laws (i.e., the securities laws' limitations
periods) is void. "What the antiwaiver provision" does, the Court said, is it "forbids... enforcement of agreements
to waive 'compliance' with the provisions of the statute." Id (emphasis added). The Court then held that
agreements to arbitrate were valid waivers even though the 1934 Act purported to reserve jurisdiction to the
federal courts because compliance with the securities laws was not waived. This construction is supported by the
intent of the anti-waiver provision. The anti-waiver provision is intended to prohibit brokers and others in the
industry from providing a reduction in commissions or other benefit in exchange for waiving compliance with
the requirements of the Exchange Act. Put another way, the anti-waiver provision serves to invalidate attempts to
obtain anticipatory waivers intended to provide immunity for breaking the securities laws. Thus, courts have held
that the provision does not apply to the release of matured claims or to waiving defenses. E.g., In re Gas
Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 713, 718-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (listing defenses); Kom v. Franchard
Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dealing with the release of matured claims).
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with the purposes of the securities laws' repose provisions. 29 5 As a general matter,
contracts rarely defeat the function of the statute so utterly that the contract may be set
aside. As explained by Judge Easterbrook:
A statutory right affects the initial bargaining position of the parties, so that the
contract affords people the benefits of the statute even as it alters the rules. The
beneficiary of the statutory right may enjoy it or trade it for something he prefers;
when a court observes that the right has been surrendered (traded) in a contract,
it may not leap to the conclusion that the statutory plan has been defeated. The
contract tells us only that the parties valued something else more highly. To
forbid the contractual waiver is to make the class of statutory beneficiaries worse
off, by depriving them of the opportunity to obtain the benefits of the statutory
entitlement by using it as a bargaining chip in the process of contracting. 296
FirstInterstatefurther explained that a waiver of limitations periods is consistent with
the repose provisions of the securities laws. According to First Interstate, the repose
provisions were designed to avoid potential problems of proof (the "stale evidence"
rationale). But with a tolling agreement, the claims are defined and there is a strong
likelihood that a similar suit is already pending, which means that the parties are already
preserving or gathering evidence. 29 7 Additionally, the court observed that repose was
designed to prevent lingering liabilities from disrupting the defendant's normal business
operations (the "litigation uncertainty rationale"). 2 98 But, the court countered, a tolling
agreement is for the benefit of both parties, including the defendant, and it is implemented
to preclude unnecessary litigation, which would have distracted the defendant from normal
business operations. 299 Other courts have likewise observed the "very important public
interest" that may be served by upholding parties' tolling agreement. 300 "Tolling
agreements allow parties to extend statutory periods while they evaluate their claims and
defenses in the hope that they can resolve their dispute without litigation." 30 1 Limitations
periods are largely about convenience for the parties; they are practical and pragmatic
devices to spare the parties from litigating stale claims. 302 So, where the parties have found
295. First InterstateBank of Denver N.A., 937 P.2d at 862-63; see also In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA
Litig., No. 11 Civ. 1281 LAK, 2012 WL 6584524, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2012) ("No public policy would be
offended by permitting a private party like Calpers to contract out of the Act's statute of repose with a particular
litigant. In fact, a very important public interest may be served in doing so. Tolling agreements allow parties to
extend statutory periods while they evaluate their claims and defenses in the hope that they can resolve their
dispute without litigation. In cases such as this one, such agreements can serve the interests of the parties, the
public, and the courts.").
296. Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 596 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
297. FirstInterstate Bank ofDenver N.A., 937 P.2d at 863.
298. Id. at 862.
299. Id. at 863; see also Stephan v. Goldinger, 325 F.3d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the tolling
agreement suspended the Commodity Exchange Act's two-year limitations period because that provision was
"intended primarily for the benefit of the defendant, to protect him from having to defend against stale claims").
300. In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. 11 Civ. 1281 LAK, 2012 WL 6584524, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 18, 2012).
301. Id.
302. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 US. 304, 314 (1945) ("Statutes of limitation find their
justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles.
They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims."); Lawyers Title Ins.
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it more convenient to toll the limitations period while the parties sort things out, it makes
no sense to force them to litigate.
Last, the FirstInterstate court explained that Lampf which refused to apply equitable
tolling to the securities laws' limitations periods, did not address the policies at play in an
agreed-upon waiver case. 30 3 Lampf foreclosed the application of equitable tolling but did
not address waiver. 304 Thus, Lampf did not preclude waiver of a limitations defense in a
tolling agreement. 305
One authority suggests that statutes of repose are not tolled by agreement. Midstate
HorticulturalCo. v. PennsylvaniaRailroadCo. 30 6 is the authority most often invoked to
argue that statutes of repose cannot be arrested via tolling agreement. That case held that a
three-year limit on suits under the Interstate Commerce Act could not be tolled by
agreement. But it did so largely because allowing tolling by agreement would have
disrupted the "uniformity and equality of treatment ... between carrier and shipper" that
the Interstate Commerce Act was meant to protect. 307 The Court specifically contrasted
that case with one in which "only the parties' private interests or equities were
involved." 30 8 Most courts have limited Midstate to cases involving shippers and
carriers. 309 And the courts have limited that holding because it was necessary to implement
the strong congressional policy favoring uniformity of rates among all shippers, a policy
that might otherwise have been undermined by applying varying periods of limitations or
by the carrier's waiver of the limitations defense in some cases but not others.

Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1166 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The practical meaning of a jurisdictional
limitation is that the court must enforce it regardless of any agreement between or conduct by the parties; it is not
only for their protection. Statutes of limitations are ordinarily for the protection of defendants and so can be
waived or forfeited by them; but they also protect the courts from the burden of adjudicating old claims. . .. If
the second goal were paramount, the period of limitations would not be within the defendant's power to waive.
But we cannot find any case that holds a federal statute of limitations jurisdictional on this ground.").
303. FirstInterstateBank ofDenverN.A., 937 P.2d at 863.
304. See In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 339 F. Supp. 2d 804, 858-59 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that Lampf
did not foreclose express waiver as grounds to arrest statute of limitations applicable to Section 11 claims); ESI
Montgomery Cnty. Inc. v. Montenay Int'l. Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 1065-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that
Lampf did not foreclose equitable estoppel or waiver as grounds to arrest the statute of limitations applicable to
Rule lOb-5 claims).
305. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 939 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125 n.7 (D.
Kan. 2013) ("Credit Suisse also relies on the Supreme Court's statement in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson that the three-year period of repose for actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act is not subject to tolling, but it was clear in that case that the Court was referring to equitable tolling.
The present case involves the issue of legal tolling by agreement.") (internal citations omitted).
306. Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 356 (1943).
307. Id. at 361.
308. Id.; see also ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5D DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 19:29
(2013) (stating that Midstate addressed a "different context" and that otherwise "[tiolling agreements should be
valid").
309. See, e.g., Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827, 830 n.7 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing constitutional
considerations vis-A-vis 'reviving a dead claim'); In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. II Civ. 1281
LAX, 2012 WL 6584524, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2012) (upholding parties' agreement to arrest statute of repose
and distinguishing Midstate Horticultural).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Many of the issues that pertain to the securities laws' limitations periods are unsettled.
There are lingering questions about whether the securities laws' limitations periods afford
any room for equitable exceptions, like tolling, estoppel, or forfeiture. And, as of late,
questions concerning how limitations periods apply in the securities class action context
have come to the fore, with courts casting doubt on whether putative class members may
rely on a class action complaint to toll the legal deadline. This uncertainty dilutes the force
of these limitations bars. But the ambiguity of limitations periods does not have to be
resolved by a court. Instead, the parties themselves can deter the use of stale evidence and
prevent the uncertainty of litigation by entering into tolling agreements. Tolling agreements
can leave the necessary time for trouble, arresting limitations periods, and thus remedying
the unclear application of statutory timeliness bars.
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